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Abstract
High Performance Computing (HPC) systems have been widely used by scientists
and researchers in both industry and university laboratories to solve advanced
computation problems. Most advanced computation problems are either data-intensive
or computation-intensive. They may take hours, days or even weeks to complete
execution. For example, some of the traditional HPC systems computations run
on 100,000 processors for weeks. Consequently traditional HPC systems often
require huge capital investments. As a result, scientists and researchers sometimes
have to wait in long queues to access shared, expensive HPC systems.
Cloud computing, on the other hand, offers new computing paradigms, capacity,
and flexible solutions for both business and HPC applications. Some of the
computation-intensive applications that are usually executed in traditional HPC
systems can now be executed in the cloud. Cloud computing price model eliminates
huge capital investments.
However, even for cloud-based HPC systems, fault tolerance is still an issue of
growing concern. The large number of virtual machines and electronic components,
as well as software complexity and overall system reliability, availability and
serviceability (RAS), are factors with which HPC systems in the cloud must
contend. The reactive fault tolerance approach of checkpoint/restart, which is
commonly used in HPC systems, does not scale well in the cloud due to resource
sharing and distributed systems networks. Hence, the need for reliable fault
tolerant HPC systems is even greater in a cloud environment.
In this thesis we present a proactive fault tolerance approach to HPC systems
in the cloud to reduce the wall-clock execution time, as well as dollar cost, in
the presence of hardware failure. We have developed a generic fault tolerance
algorithm for HPC systems in the cloud. We have further developed a cost model
for executing computation-intensive applications on HPC systems in the cloud.
Our experimental results obtained from a real cloud execution environment show
that the wall-clock execution time and cost of running computation-intensive
applications in the cloud can be considerably reduced compared to checkpoint
and redundancy techniques used in traditional HPC systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the scientific research domain, High Performance Computing (HPC) refers to
the use of supercomputers, grid environments and/or clusters of computers to
solve advanced computational problems. A computer cluster is a combination
of commodities unit (PCs, processors, networks or symmetric multi-processor
(SMPs)).
HPC systems play important roles in today’s society. Common applications
include weather forecasting, aircraft crash simulation, computational fluid dynamics
for studies in aerodynamics, bioinformatics, protein folding for molecular modelling
in biomedical research, and many others [4, 5]. It has been estimated that
improvements in HPC systems leading to more accurate seismic modelling of oil
reservoirs could increase oil recovery by 50-75% [6].
Today, HPC systems also offer new opportunities in business [7]. For example,
financial institutions currently use HPC systems in real time modelling to make
informed investment decisions.
Analysis of the Top500 [2] HPC systems shows that the number of processors
and nodes in HPC systems has increased over time in the quest for greater
performance levels. Top500 is a detailed statistical ranking of the world’s 500 most
1
powerful supercomputers. The list is compiled twice a year. Figure 1.1 shows
the performance development of Top500 HPC systems between 1993 and 2012,
and the projected performance development for 2020. HPC systems continue to
grow exponentially in scale, from petascale computing floating point operations
per second to exascale computing floating point operations per second). As can
be seen, performance almost doubles each year due in large part to the steady
increase in the density of transistors in integrated circuits.
As noted above, this performance development is associated with growth in
the number of processors in each HPC system. Figure 1.2 shows the growth in
the number of processors between 1993 and 2012, based on an analysis of HPC
systems development data provided in the Top500 [2].
There are, however, a number of technical challenges for HPC systems as
they grow to exascale [8, 9]. Although the Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF)
of individual system components may be high, the overall system Mean Time
Between Failure is reduced to just a few hours due to the increased number of
processors involved [10, 11]. For example, the IBM Blue Gene/L was built with
131,000 processors. To calculate its MTBF, we assume that each processor has a
constant failure rate. If the MTBF of each processor is 876000 hours (100 years),
a cluster of 131,000 processors will have an expected MTBF of 876000/131000 =
6.68 hours.
The importance of fault tolerance for HPC systems has been widely recognised
by various research communities in HPC systems. Many approaches have been
proposed to provide fault tolerance in HPC systems [12, 13, 14, 11, 15, 16, 17].
Approaches such as [15, 16], explore redundancy and rollback-recovery techniques
respectively.
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1.1 Background
Rollback-recovery is one of the most widely used fault tolerance mechanisms
for HPC systems. Rollback-recovery consists of checkpoint, failure detection
and recovery/restart. However, rollback-recovery usually increases the wall clock
execution time of HPC applications, thereby increasing the electrical energy used
and the dollar cost of running HPC applications in both traditional HPC system
and in HPC systems in the cloud.
Cloud computing offers new computing paradigms, capacity, and flexibility
to HPC applications through provisioning of a large number of Virtual Machines
(VMs) for computation-intensive applications using cloud services. It is expected
that computation-intensive applications will increasingly be deployed and run in
HPC systems in the cloud [18, 19]. For example, the Amazon Elastic Compute
Cloud (Amazon EC2 [20] cluster recently appeared in the Top500 list.
The aim of this thesis is to provide fault tolerance for HPC systems in the
cloud, particularly when Hardware as a Service (HaaS) is leased. We propose a
framework, develop and implement the associated algorithms and test a solution
using the C programming language. The solution proposed in this thesis covers
hardware failures that occur after warning window.
1.1 Background
The history of HPC systems dates back to the 1960s when parallel and distributed
computing were used to achieve high computational performance. Parallel
computing uses shared memory to exchange information between processors
while distributed computing uses distributed memory, with information shared
between processors by message passing. Recently, it has become difficult to
5
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distinguish between parallel and distributed systems, since parallel computers
often have some distributed characteristics. This is clearly demonstrated in the
Top500 list
Today, parallel and distributed computing systems with large numbers of
processors are commonly known as HPC systems. HPC systems scale from a few
hundred processors to hundreds of thousands of processors, such as the Clay Titan
[2].
Computation-intensive applications are sometimes referred to as long-running
applications and are most often scientific computations using mathematical models
and quantitative analysis techniques running on HPC systems to analyse and
solve large and complex scientific problems. Some of the scientific computations
would have been too difficult to carry out without HPC systems, due to the
capital cost, complexity or financial risk involved (for example, in nuclear weapons
experiments).
With cloud computing, HPC systems are no longer limited to large organisations
but are also available to individuals. Cloud computing [18] promises numerous
benefits, including the fact that there is no need for up-front investment in the
purchase and installation of equipment and software. An HPC system in the cloud
is a good alternative to a traditional HPC system.
1.2 Motivation
As noted above, fault tolerance is one of the major challenges faced by cloud services
for HPC applications. Evidence shows that a system with 100,000 processors will
experience a processor failure every few hours [21, 9]. A failure occurs when a
6
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hardware component fails and needs replacement, a software component fails or a
node/processor halts or is forced to reboot, or software fails to complete its run.
In such cases, an application utilising the failed component will fail.
In addition, HPC applications deployed in the cloud run on virtual machines,
which are more likely to fail due to resource sharing and contention [19, 22].
Therefore, fault tolerance (FT) technology is particularly important for HPC
applications running in cloud environments, because fault tolerance means there
is no need to restart a long-running application from the beginning in the event
of a failure, thereby reducing operational costs and energy consumption.
1.3 Identification of Key Research Problems
This section describes the three key challenges for HPC systems that are addressed
by this thesis: 1) fault tolerance, 2) rollback-recovery and 3) energy efficiency.
These are significant problems for HPC system communities. The thesis also
aims to contribute to improvements in HPC systems in the cloud by providing a
detailed study of current research in the field.
1.3.1 Fault Tolerance
Recent studies by Schroeder and Gibson [23, 9], Egwutuoha, et al. [11], and
Yigitbasi, et al. [24] and the data sets provided in [3], show that hardware
(processors, hard disk drive, integrated circuit sockets, and memory) causes more
than 50% of the failures on HPC systems. These works also show that:
1. The failure rate is almost proportional to the number of CPUs (failure
increases with the number of nodes and/or processors).
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2. The intensity of the workload affects the failure rate [23, 9].
3. There is a time varying correlation with failure rate [24].
1.3.2 Rollback-Recovery
The rollback-recovery fault tolerance technique is commonly used by HPC systems
communities [16, 25]. It tends to minimise the impact of failure on
computation-intensive applications running in a HPC system when one or more
computational nodes fail. A good example of rollback-recovery fault tolerance
is checkpoint and restart. Checkpoint and restart allows computation-intensive
problems that may take a long time to execute in HPC systems to be restarted
from the checkpoint prior to failure in the event of errors or failures.
However, recent publications [23, 10, 26, 14] show that, with the steadily
increasing number of components in today‘s HPC systems, applications running
on HPC systems may not be able to achieve meaningful progress with the basic
checkpoint and restart approach. This is because the system will spend most of its
computational time in checkpoint, which is not part of the computational activities.
A fault tolerant solution that will reduce the overhead of rollback-recovery is
particularly important.
1.3.3 Energy Efficiency
HPC systems utilize large amounts of electrical power to operate their large
numbers of processors, electronic components and other electrical parts that
support constitute them. For example, it is estimated that IBM BlueGene/L
which is built to use low power components, costs between $200,000 to $1.2 million
8
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annually [27].
Because of this high energy utilisation, the HPC community created the
Green500 [28] list. The performance of HPC systems is now measured not only in
floating point operations per second (FLOPS) but also in FLOPS per watt. Clearly,
the high energy utilisation of HPC systems presents a challenge that cannot be
ignored in the design of fault tolerance for HPC systems. With energy efficient fault
tolerant solution, electrical energy would be utilised in computational activities
with minimisation of rework activities due to failure. Hence, the development of
energy efficient fault tolerant HPC systems will make a significant improvement in
terms of the energy utilisation and operational cost of HPC systems, particularly
HPC systems in the cloud.
1.4 Contributions
In addressing these key research problems, the thesis makes the following major
contributions to the field of HPC systems in the cloud:
1. We propose a fault tolerance framework for High Performance Computing
(HPC) in the cloud [29] that can be used to build a reliable HPC systems in
the cloud.
2. We propose a proactive fault tolerance approach to High Performance
Computing (HPC) in the cloud. We develop an algorithm and corresponding
software solution for HPC systems in the cloud to support users and
researchers who lease HaaS [30].
3. We present an empirical analysis of the proposed solution that demonstrates
9
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its cost effectiveness and electrical energy efficiency [31, 32]. The empirical
analysis presented on this thesis is general and can be used to analysed
similar cloud-based systems.
4. We analyse two cloud services that are usually used for HPC in the cloud
and identify the most cost effective cloud service for a HPC system in the
cloud [33]. This can assist in choosing HPC systems in the cloud that are
cost effective.
1.5 Thesis Outline
The thesis is divided into six chapters, as shown in Figure 1.3. This chapter has
described the background to, and motivation for, the research and has identified
key research problems and contributions. Chapter 2 surveys fault tolerance
approaches, analysis of failure rates and rollback feature requirements for modern
HPC systems and evaluates over 20 previous works on checkpoint/restart facilities.
Chapter 3 explains the theoretical background of the study, including definitions
of the HPC in the cloud concept, architecture, related services and fault tolerance
deficiencies. Chapter 4 presents a new proactive fault tolerance approach to High
Performance Computing (HPC) in the cloud, including the algorithms, design
approaches, implementations, evaluations and test results. Chapter 5 reports the
cost analysis and energy utilisation of the approach, and Chapter 6 concludes the
discussion and makes recommendations for future work.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
“Fault tolerance is the property that enables a system (often computer-based)
to continue operating properly in the event of the failure of (or one or more
faults within) some of its components” [34]. Fault tolerance is highly desirable in
HPC systems because it may ensure that computation-intensive applications are
completed in a timely manner. In some fault tolerant systems, a combination of
one or more techniques is used.
This chapter begins with an analysis of the failure rates of HPC systems.
This is followed by a review of fault tolerance approaches that examines the
issues associated with each approach in the context of HPC systems. Research
efforts directed at reducing the time to checkpoint in persistent storage are briefly
discussed. Much of the content of this chapter appears in previously published
work [11, 32].
2.1 Analysis of Failure Rates of HPC Systems
Generally, failures occur as a result of hardware or software faults, human factors,
malicious attacks, network congestion, increased intensity of workload (overload),
12
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and, possibly, other unknown causes [35, 36, 1, 37]. These failures may cause
computational errors. They may be transient or intermittent, but can still lead to
permanent failures [38]. A transient failure causes a component to malfunction
for a certain period of time, but it then disappears and the functionality of that
component is fully restored. An intermittent failure appears and disappears
sporadically; it never goes away completely, unless it is resolved. A permanent
failure causes the component to malfunction consistently until it is replaced. A
great deal of work has been done on understanding the causes of failure and we
briefly review the major contributors to failure in this section. We also include
our findings from the present study.
2.1.1 Software Failure Rates
Gray [35] analyzed outage/failure reports of Tandem computer systems between
1985 and 1990, and found that software failure caused about 55% of outages.
Tandem systems were designed to be single-fault fault-tolerant systems, that is,
systems capable of overcoming the failure of a single element (but not overlapping
multiple failures). Each Tandem system consisted of 4 to 16 processors, 6 to 100
discs, 100 to 1000 terminals and their communication equipment. Systems with
more than 16 processors were partitioned to form multiple systems and each of
the multiple systems had 10 processors linked together to form an application
system.
Lu [37] studied the failure log of three different architectures at the National
Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA). The systems were:
1. A cluster of 12 SGI Origin 2000 NUMA (Non-Uniform Memory Architecture)
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distributed shared memory supercomputers with a total of 1,520 Central
Processing Units (CPUs),
2. “Platinum”, a PC cluster with 1,040 CPUs and 520 nodes, and
3. “Titan”, a cluster of 162 two-way SMP 800 MHz Itanium-1 nodes (324
CPUs).
In the study, five types of outages/failures were defined: software halt, hardware
halt, scheduled maintenance, network outages, and air conditioning or power halts.
Lu found that software failure was the main contributor to outage (59-83%),
suggesting that software failure rates are higher than hardware failure rates.
Similarly, El-Sayed and Schroeder [39] studied field failure data of HPC systems
available at [40]. The failure data studies were collected over 9 years period. They
observed that there is significant relationship between network, environmental
and software failures. They also observed that there is a significant increase in
the probability of software failure after power issues had occurred.
Nagappan, et al [41] studied the failure log files of on-demand virtual computing
lab at North Carolina State University [42]. Virtual computing lab at North
Carolina State University is operated as private cloud with more than 2000
computers. In this study, they observed that system software contributes relatively
small role in system failure. According to their finding, most of the recorded
failures were caused by workload, license exhaustion and hardware failures.
2.1.2 Hardware Failure Rates
A large set of failure data, the computer failure data repository (CFDR) was also
released by the USENIX Association [3]. It comprised the failure statistics of 22
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HPC systems, including a total of 4,750 nodes and 24,101 processors collected over
a period of 9 years at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The workloads
consisted of large-scale long-running 3D scientific simulations that take months
to complete. We have further analysed the data in order to reveal the systems
failure rates in more detail. Figure 2.1 shows systems (2 to 24) with different
configurations and architectures, with the number of nodes varying from 1 to
1024 and the number of processors varying from 4 to 6152. System 2 with 6152
processors recorded the highest number of hardware failures. Figure 2.1 also
shows the number of failures and corresponding causes recorded over the period,
represented by a bar chart. From the bar chart, it can be clearly seen that
the failure rates of HPC systems increase linearly as the number of nodes and
processors increases.
To further examine the failure rates, we selected seven HPC systems from
the failure data repository [3]. The systems selected consist of five clusters
with the highest number of totals CPUs and/or compute nodes, one Symmetric
MultiProcessing (SMP) system with the highest number of CPUs, and the only
Non-Uniform Memory Access (NUMA) system in the data repository. Figure 2.2
shows the analysis of failure rates of HPC systems with their system IDs.
As can be seen from Figures 2.1 and 2.2, more than 60% of the recorded
failures that occurred on HPC systems are hardware failures.
Schroeder and Gibson [9, 23] analysed failure data collected at two large HPC
sites: the data set from LANL RAS [3] and the data set collected over a period of
one year at a large supercomputing system with 20 nodes and more than 10,000
processors. Their analysis suggests that:
1. The mean repair time across all failures (irrespective of failure types) is
15
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about 6 hours.
2. There is a relationship between the failure rate of a system and the applications
running on it.
3. As many as three failures may occur on some systems within 24 hours.
4. The failure rate is almost proportional to the number of processors in a
system.
Oliner and Stearley [1] studied system logs from five supercomputers installed
at Sandia National Labs (SNL) as well as Blue Gene/L, which is installed at
Lawrence Livermore National Labs (LLNL). The five systems were ranked in the
Top500 supercomputers at the time of their study. The systems were structured
as follows: 1) Blue Gene/L with 131,072 CPUs and a custom interconnect; 2)
Thunderbird with 9,024 CPUs and an InfiniBand interconnect; 3) Red Storm with
10,880 CPUs and a custom interconnect; 4) Spirit (ICC2) with 1,028 CPUs and
a GigEthernet (Gigabit Ethernet) interconnect; and 5) Liberty with 512 CPUs
and a Myrinet interconnect. A summary of the systems is provided in Table
2.1. Although the raw data appeared to show that 98% of the failures were due
to hardware, after the data were filtered, the analysis revealed that 64% of the
failures were due to software.
Table 2.1: Summary of HPC systems studied by Oliner and Stearley [1]
No System name System configuration
1 Blue Gene/L 131,072 CPUs and custom interconnect
2 Thunderbird 9,024 CPUs and an InfiniBand interconnect
3 Red Storm 10,880 CPUs and a custom interconnect
4 Spirit (ICC2) 1,028 CPUs and a GigEthernet (Gigabit Ethernet) interconnect
5 Liberty 512 CPUs and a Myrinet interconnect
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2.1.3 Human Error Failure Rates
Oppenheimer and Patterson [36] report that operator error is one of the largest
single root causes of failure. According to their report, Architecture and Dependability
of Large-Scale Internet Services, the failures occurred when operational staff made
changes to the system, such as replacement of hardware, reconfiguration of the
system, deployment, patching, software upgrade and system maintenance. They
attributed 14-30% of failures to human error.
Thus we can conclude that almost all failures of computation-intensive
applications are due to hardware failures, software failures and human error. It is
difficult, however, to specify the single major cause of failures, since the analyses
reported above were carried out:
1. using different systems on which different applications were running;
2. under different environmental conditions; and
3. using different data correlating periods and methods.
Consequently, effective fault tolerant HPC systems should address hardware and
software failures as well as human error.
2.2 Review of Fault Tolerance Mechanisms for
High Performance Computing Systems
Figure 2.3 shows an abstract view of the fault tolerance techniques used in this
review. We use the feature modelling technique [43] to model this abstract
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view because of its conceptual simplicity and because it makes it easy to map
dependencies in an abstract representation. The most widely used fault tolerance
techniques in HPC systems are migration methods, redundancy (hardware and
software), failure masking, failure semantics and rollback-recovery techniques [44,
13, 26]. Each is briefly summarised below.
2.2.1 Migration Method
With recent advances in virtualisation technologies, migration can be categorised
into two major groups: process-level migration and Virtual Machine (VM)
migration. Process-level migration is the movement of an executing process
from its current node to a different node. The techniques commonly used in
process-level migration are eager, pre-copy, post-copy, flushing and live migration
techniques [45]. VM migration is the movement of a VM from one node/machine
to a new node. Stop-and-copy and live migration of VMs are the most commonly
used techniques [46].
In the migration approach, the key idea is to avoid an application failure
by taking preventive action. When a part of an application running on a node
seems likely to fail (which may lead to failure of the whole application), that
part of the application that is likely to fail is migrated to a safe node and the
application continues. This technique relies primarily on accurate prediction of
the location, time, and type of failure that will occur. Reliability, availability,
and serviceability (RAS) log files are commonly used to develop the prediction
algorithm [47]. RAS log files contain features that will assist in accomplishing
RAS goals - minimal downtime, minimal unplanned downtime, rapid recovery
20
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after a failure, and manageability of the system (the ease with which diagnosis
and repair of problems can be carried out). Error events and warning messages
are examples of information contained in a RAS log.
Failure types that have not been recorded in RAS log files will not be correctly
predicted. It is still a challenge to build accurate failure predictors for petascale and
exascale systems with thousands of processors and nodes [10]. A failure predictor
may predict failures that will never occur; these are called ”false positives” and
may fail to predict failures that do occur. Therefore, the migration method should
be used with other fault tolerance techniques such as checkpoint/restart facilities
in order to build robust fault tolerance HPC systems.
2.2.2 Redundancy
With physical redundancy techniques, redundant components or processes are
added to make it possible for the HPC system to tolerate failures [13, 48]. The
critical components are replicated (as spare) as, for example, in the Blue Gene/L
and Tandem nonstop systems. In the event of hardware failure of one component,
other components that are in good working order continue to perform until the
failed part is replaced. Hardware redundancy is commonly used to provide fault
tolerance to hardware failures. The process of voting may be employed as proposed
in n (n >2) modular redundancy [12]. Usually, n=3, but some systems use n >3,
along with majority voting.
Software redundancy can be grouped into two major approaches: process pairs
and Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR). In the process pair technique, two types
of processes are created, a primary (active) process and a backup (passive) process.
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The primary and backup processes are identical but execute on different processors
and the backup process takes over when the primary process fails. It uses module
signal failure techniques or ‘I am alive message’ to detect failure [49]
In the TMR approach, three modules are created, they perform a process and
the result is processed by a voting system to produce a single output. If any
one of the three modules fails, the other two modules can correct and mask the
fault. A fault in a module may not be detected if all three modules have identical
faults because they will all produce the same erroneous output. To address that,
N-version programming [50], and N self-checking [51] have been proposed. There
are other methods as well, such as recovery blocks, reversible computation, range
estimation, and post-condition evaluation [38]. N-version programming is also
known as multiple version programming. In this approach, different software
versions are developed by independent development teams, but with the same
specifications. The different software versions are then run concurrently to provide
fault tolerance to software design faults that escaped detection. During runtime,
the results from different versions are voted on and a single output is selected. In
recovery block techniques, N unique versions of the software are developed, but
they are subjected to a common acceptance test. The input data are also check-
pointed, before the execution of the primary version. If the result passes the
acceptance test, the system will use the primary version, or else it will rollback to
the previous checkpoint to try the alternative versions. The system fails if none of
the versions passes the acceptance test. In N self-checking programming, N unique
versions of the software are also developed, but each has its own acceptance test.
The software version that passes its own acceptance test is selected through an
acceptance voting system.
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Software systems usually have a large number of states (upward of 1040) [52]
which implies that only a small part of the software can be verified for correctness.
2.2.3 Failure Masking
Failure masking techniques provide fault tolerance by ensuring that services are
available to clients despite failure of a worker, by means of a group of redundant
and physically independent workers. In the event of failure of one or more
members of the group, the services are still provided to clients by the surviving
members of the group, often without the clients noticing any disruption. There
are two masking techniques used to achieve failure masking: hierarchical group
masking and flat group masking [44]. Figure 2.4 illustrates the flat group and the
hierarchical group masking methods.
Flat group masking is symmetrical and does not have a single point of failure;
the individual workers are hidden from the clients, appearing as a single worker.
A voting process is used to select a worker in event of failure. The voting process
may introduce some delays and overhead because a decision is only reached when
inputs from various workers have been received and compared.
In hierarchical group failure masking, a coordinator of the activities of the
group decides within a group which worker may replace a failed worker in the event
of failure. This approach has a single point of failure; the ability to effectively
mask failures depends on the semantic specifications implemented [53].
Fault masking may create new errors, hazards and critical operational failures
when operational staff fails to replace already failed components [54]. When failure
masking is used, the system should be regularly inspected. However, there are
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costs associated with regular inspections.
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Figure 2.4: Flat group and hierarchical group masking
2.2.4 Failure Semantics
Failure semantics refers to the different ways in which a system designer anticipates
the system can fail, along with failure handling strategies for each failure mode.
This list is then used to decide what kind of fault tolerance mechanisms to provide
in the system. In other words, with failure semantics [44], the anticipated types of
system failure are built within the fault tolerance system and the recovery actions
are invoked upon detection of failures. Some of the different failure semantics are
omission failure semantics, performance semantics, and crash failure semantics.
Fail-stop failure semantics apply if the only failure that the designers anticipate
from a component is for it to stop processing instructions, while behaving correctly
prior to that [55]. Omission failure semantics apply if the designers expect a
communication service to lose messages, with negligible chances that messages are
delayed or corrupted. Omission/performance failure semantics apply when the
designers expect a service to lose or delay messages, but with lesser probability
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that messages can be corrupted.
The fault tolerant system is built based on foreknowledge of the anticipated
failure patterns and it reacts to them when these patterns are detected; hence
the level of fault tolerance depends on the likely failure behaviours of the model
implemented. Broad classes of failure modes with associated failure semantics
may also be defined (rather than specific individual failure types). This technique
relies on the ability of the designer to predict failure modes accurately and to
specify the appropriate action to be taken when a failure scenario is detected. It
is not feasible, however, in any system of any complexity such as HPC systems,
to predict all possible failure modes. For example, a processor can achieve crash
failure semantics with duplicate processors. Failure semantics may also require
hardware modifications [56]. Similarly, some of the nodes and applications failures
which occur in HPC systems may be unknown to the fault tolerance in place.
For example, a new virus may exhibit a new behaviour pattern which would go
undetected even though it could crash the system [57]. An unidentified failure
could also lead to stoppage.
2.2.5 Recovery
Generally, fault tolerance implies recovering from an error which otherwise may
lead to computational error or system failure. The main idea is to replace the
erroneous state with a correct and stable state. There are two forms of error
recovery mechanisms: forward and backward error recovery.
Forward Error Recovery: With Forward Error Recovery (FER) [58]
mechanisms, an effort is made to bring the system to a new correct state from which
26
2.2 Review of Fault Tolerance Mechanisms for High Performance
Computing Systems
it can continue to execute, without the need to repeat any previous computations.
FER, in other words, implies detailed understanding of the impact of the error on
the system, and a good strategy for later recovery. FER is commonly implemented
where continued service is more important than immediate recovery, and high
levels of accuracy in values may be sacrificed; that is, where it is required to act
urgently (in, e.g., mission-critical environments) to keep the system operational.
FER is commonly used in flight control operation, where future recovery may
be preferable to rollback-recovery. A good example of forward correction is fault
masking, such as the voting process employed in triple modular redundancy and
in N-version programming.
As the number of redundant components increases, the overhead cost of FER
and of the CPU increases because recovery is expected to be completed in the
degraded operating states, and the possibility of reconstruction of data may
be small in such states [59]. Software systems typically have large numbers of
states and multiple concurrent operations [60], which implies that there may
be low probability of recovery to a valid state. It may be possible in certain
scenarios to predict the fault; however, it may be difficult to design an appropriate
solution in the event of unanticipated faults. In complex systems, FER cannot
guarantee that state variables required for the future computation are correctly
re-established following a fault; therefore, the result of the computations following
an error occurrence may be erroneous. FER is also more difficult to implement
compared to rollback-recovery techniques, because of the number of states and
concurrent operations. In some applications, a combination of both forward and
rollback-recovery may be desirable.
Rollback-recovery: Rollback-recovery consists of checkpoint, failure detection
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and recovery/restart. A checkpoint [38] is a snapshot of the state of the entire
process at a particular point such that the process could be restarted from that
point in the event that a subsequent failure is detected. Rollback-recovery is one
of the most widely used fault tolerance mechanism for HPC systems, probably
because:
1. Failures in HPC systems often lead to fail-stop of the application execution.
2. Rollback-recovery technique uses a fail-stop model (discussed in Chapter 3)
whereby a failed process can be restarted from saved checkpoint data.
In addition, rollback-recovery is used to protect against failures in parallel
systems because of the following major advantages [61]:
1. It allows computational problems that take days to execute in HPC systems
to be checkpointed and restarted (from the last saved) in event of failures
instead of restarting the application from the beginning.
2. It allows load balancing and for applications to be migrated to other nodes,
or even another system where computation can be resumed if an executing
node fails.
3. It has lower implementation cost compared to hardware redundancy.
4. It reduces electrical power consumption compared to hardware redundancy.
The major disadvantage is that rollback-recovery does not protect against
design faults (software fault). After rollback the system continues processing as
it did previously. This will recover from a transient fault, but if the fault was
caused by a design fault, then the system will fail and recover endlessly, unless
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an alternate computational path is provided during the recovery phase. Note
that some states cannot be recovered, if all components use checkpointing, an
invalid message can be sent to other applications, causing them to roll back and
then consume fresh, correct results. This is similar to invalidation protocols
in distributed caches as discussed in [62]. Despite these limitations, the need
to ensure that computation-intensive parallel applications complete successfully
necessitates its use. Two major techniques are used to implement rollback-recovery:
checkpoint-based rollback-recovery and log-based rollback-recovery. These
techniques and over 20 checkpoint/restart facilities are discussed in detail in our
earlier work [11].
A great deal of research has been carried out on checkpoint and restart but
some issues [26, 8] are yet to be addressed:
1. The number of transient errors could increase exponentially because of the
exponential increase in the number of transistors in integrated circuits in
HPC systems.
2. Some faults may go undetected (e.g., software errors), which would lead
to further erroneous computations in long-running applications, potentially
resulting in complete failure of an HPC system.
3. Correctable errors may also lead to software instability due to persistent
error recovery activities.
4. How to reduce the time required to save the execution state, which is one of
the major sources of overhead.
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2.3 Rollback-recovery Feature Requirements for
HPC Systems
We define the following rollback-recovery feature requirements which are
important to HPC fault tolerance systems [63, 64, 65]. We do not claim that
these features are necessary or sufficient, since future technological developments
may force additional requirements or, conversely, eliminate some of them from
the list. These feature requirements will be used to evaluate the applicability of
different checkpointing/restart facilities listed in this survey.
1. Transparency: A good fault tolerance approach should be transparent;
ideally, it should not require source code or application modifications, nor
re-compilation and re-linking of user binaries, because new software bugs
could be introduced into the system.
2. Application coverage: The checkpointing solution must have a wide range of
applications coverage, to reduce the likelihood of implementing and using
multiple different of checkpointing/restart solutions which may lead to
software conflicts and greater performance overhead.
3. Platform portability: It must not be tightly coupled to one version of an
operating system or application framework, so that it can be ported to other
platforms with minimal effort.
4. Intelligence/Automatic: It should use failure prediction and failure detection
mechanisms to determine when checkpointing/restart should occur without
the user’s intervention. Whenever this feature is lacking, users are required
to initialise the checkpointing/restart process. Although system users may
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be trained to carry out the checkpoint/restart activities, human error can
still be introduced if system users have to initiate the checkpoint or recovery
processes [66].
5. Low overhead: Low overhead: The time to save checkpoint data should
be significantly shorter compared to the 40 to 60 minutes that has been
recorded on some of the top500 HPC systems [26]. The size of the checkpoint
should be minimised.
2.4 Checkpoint-based Rollback-recovery
Mechanisms
In checkpoint-based rollback-recovery, an application is rolled back to the most
recent consistent state using checkpoint data. Due to the global consistency state
issue in distributed systems [16], checkpointing of applications running in this type
of environment is quite difficult to implement compared to uniprocessor systems.
This is because different processors in the HPC system may be at different stages
in the parallel computation and thus require global coordination, but it is difficult
to obtain a consistent global state for checkpointing. (Due to drift variations
in local clocks it is generally not practical to use clock-based methods for this
purpose.) A consistent global checkpoint is a collection of local checkpoints, one
from every processor, such that each local checkpoint is synchronised to every
other local checkpoint [67]. The process of establishing a consistent state in
distributed systems may force other application processes to roll back to their
checkpoints even if they did not experience failure, which, in turn, may cause
other processes to roll back to even earlier checkpoints. This effect is called
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the domino effect [68]. In the most extreme case this domino effect may lead
to the only consistent state being the initial state, clearly something that is
not very useful. There are three main approaches to dealing with this problem
in HPC systems: uncoordinated checkpointing, coordinated checkpointing, and
communication-induced checkpointing. We briefly discuss each of these below.
Uncoordinated checkpointing allows different processes to do checkpoints when
it is most convenient for each process thereby reducing overhead [69]. Multiple
checkpoints are maintained by the processes, which increase the storage overhead
[70]. With this approach it might be difficult to find a globally consistent state,
rendering the checkpoint ineffective. Therefore uncoordinated checkpointing is
vulnerable to the domino effect and may lead to undesirable loss of computational
work.
Coordinated checkpointing guarantees consistent global states by enforcing each
of the processes to synchronize their checkpoints. Coordinated checkpointing has
the advantages that it makes recovery from failed states simpler and is not prone
to the domino effect. Storage overhead is also reduced compared to uncoordinated
checkpointing, because each process maintains only one checkpoint on stable
permanent storage. However, it adds overhead because a global checkpoint needs
internal synchronization to occur prior to checkpointing. A number of checkpoint
protocols have been proposed to ensure global coordination. A non-blocking
checkpointing coordination protocol was proposed [71] to ensure that applications
which would render coordinated checkpointing inconsistent, are prevented from
running. Checkpointing with synchronised clocks [72] has also been proposed. The
DMTCP [65] checkpointing facility is an example that implements a coordinated
checkpointing mechanism.
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Communication-induced checkpointing (CIC) (also called message induced
checkpointing) protocols do not require that all checkpoints be consistent, and
still avoids the domino effect. With this technique, processes perform two types of
checkpoints: local and forced checkpoints. A local checkpoint is a snapshot of the
local state of a process, saved on persistent storage. Local checkpoints are taken
independently of the global state. Forced checkpoints are taken when the protocol
forces the processes to make an additional checkpoint. The main advantage of CIC
protocols is that they allow independence in detecting when to checkpoint. The
overhead is reduced because a process can take local checkpoints when the process
state is small. CIC, however, has two major disadvantages: (1) it generates large
numbers of forced checkpoints with resulting storage overhead; and (2) the data
piggybacked on the messages generates considerable communications overhead.
2.4.1 Log-based Rollback-recovery Mechanisms
Log-based rollback-recovery mechanismsare similar to checkpoint-based
rollback-recovery except that messages sent and received by each process are
recorded in a log. The recorded information in the message log is called a
determinant. In the event of failure, the process can be recovered using the
checkpoint and reapplying the logged determinants to replay its associated
non-determinants events and to reconstruct its previous state. There are three
main mechanisms: pessimistic, optimistic, and casual message logging mechanisms.
A complete review of these techniques can be found in [16]. Pessimistic message
logging protocols record the determinant of each event to stable storage before it
is allowed to trigger the execution of the application. The main advantages of
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this method are: (1) that the recovery of the failed application is simplified by
allowing each process of the failed application to recover to the known state in
relationship with other applications; and (2) that only the latest checkpoint is
stored, while older ones are discarded. However, the process is blocked while the
event determinant is logged to a stable state, which incurs an overhead.
In optimistic logging protocols, the determinant of each process is logged to
volatile storage; events are allowed to trigger the execution of application before
logging of the determinant is concluded. This method is good as long as the fault
did not occur between the non-determinant event and subsequent logging of the
determinant event. Consequently, overhead is reduced because volatile storage is
used; however, the recovery process may not be possible if the volatile store loses
its content due to power failure.
Casual message logging protocols utilise the advantages of both pessimistic and
optimistic message logging protocols. Here the messages logs are stored in stable
storage when it is most convenient for the process to do so. In casual message
logging protocols, processes piggyback the non determinant messages on the local
storage. Therefore only the most recent message log is required for restarting and
multiple copies are kept, making the logs available in event of multiple machine
failure. Further discussion of the piggyback concept in casual message logging
protocols is found in [46, 16]. The main disadvantage of the casual message logging
protocol is that it requires a more complex recovery protocol.
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In this section, three major approaches to implementing checkpoint/restart systems
are described: application-level implementation, user-level implementation and
system level implementation. The implementation level refers to how it integrates
with the application and platform. Figure 2.5 shows the taxonomy of checkpoint
implementation.
In application-level implementations, the programmer or some automated
pre-processor injects the checkpointing code directly into the application code.
The checkpointing activities are carried out by the application. Basically it
involves inserting checkpointing code where the amount of state that needs to be
saved is small, saving the checkpoint in persistent storage, and restarting from
the checkpoint if a failure had occurred [73]. Application-level checkpointing
accommodates heterogeneous systems, but lacks transparency, which is usually
available with a kernel-level or a user-level approach. The major challenge in this
approach is that it requires the programmer to have a good understanding of the
applications to be checkpointed. (Note that programmers (users) may not always
have access to the application source code.) The Cornell Checkpoint(pre) Compiler
(C3) [74] is an excellent implementation of application-level checkpointing.
With user-level implementations, a user-level library is used to do the
checkpointing and the application programs are linked to the library. Some typical
library implementations are Esky [75], Condo [76], and libckpt [77]. This approach
is usually not transparent to users because applications are modified, recompiled
and re-linked to the checkpoint library before the checkpoint facility is used. The
major disadvantages of these implementations are that they impose limitations
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on which system calls applications can make. Some shell scripts and parallel
applications may not be checkpointed even though they should be because the
library may not have access to the system files [25].
Checkpoint/restart may also be implemented at the system level, either in
the OS kernel or in hardware. When implemented at the system level, it is can
be transparent to the user and usually no modification of application program
code is required. Applications can be checkpointed at any time under control of a
system parameter that defines the checkpoint interval. Examples of system-level
implementations include CRAK [78], Zap [79], and BLCR [63]. These offer a choice
of periodic and non-periodic mechanisms. It may be challenging to checkpoint at
this level because not all operating system vendors make the kernel source code
available for modification, but if a package for a particular OS exists, then it is
very easy to use, as the user does not have to do anything once the package is
installed. One drawback, however, is that a kernel level implementation is not
portable to other platforms [74].
Hardware-level checkpointing uses digital hardware to customise a cluster
of commodity hardware for checkpointing. It is transparent to users. Different
hardware checkpointing approaches have been proposed, including SWICH [80].
Hardware checkpointing could be implemented with FPGAs [81]. Additional
hardware is required and there is the overhead cost of building specialised hardware
if this approach is selected. Hardware-level checkpointing is also not portable,
which is a significant disadvantage.
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Figure 2.5: Taxonomy of Checkpoint Implementation
2.6 Reducing the Time for Saving the Checkpoint
in Persistent Storage
There are techniques designed to reduce the overhead cost in saving the checkpoint
data when writing the state of a process to persistent storage. This is, of course,
one of the major sources of increased performance overhead. We briefly discuss
here some of these techniques.
In incremental checkpointing, only the portion of the program that has changed
since the last saved process [77] is saved. The unchanged portion can be restored
from previous checkpoints. The overhead of checkpointing is reduced in this
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process. However, the recovery could be complex because the multiple incremental
saved files are kept and grow with each checkpoint. This can be limited to at
most n increments, after which a full checkpoint is saved as is commonly done in
storage backup systems.
Flash-based Solid State Disk (SSD) memory may also be used as a persistent
store for the checkpoint data. SSD is based on semiconductor chips rather than
magnetic media technology such as hard drives, to store persistent data. SSD has
lower access times and latency compared to hard disks, however it has limited
read/write cycles of about 100,000 times and data may be difficult to access after
this threshold has been exceeded [82]. Wear leveling is used to minimise this
problem [83].
Copy-on-write[77] techniques reduce the checkpoint time by allowing the
parent process to fork a child process at each checkpoint. The parent process
continues execution while the child process carries out checkpointing activities.
The technique is useful in reducing checkpoint time when the checkpoint data is
small. However, there is a performance degradation if the size of the checkpoint
data is large because the child and parent processes will compete for computer
resources (e.g., memories and network bandwidth).
Data compression reduces the size of checkpoint data to be saved on the
storage, thereby reducing the time to save the checkpoint data. However it takes
time and computer resources to carry out the compression. Plank [84] showed
that checkpointing can benefit from data compression techniques. However, data
compression depends on the compression ratio and application state. If the
amount of data to compress is large it consumes more memory, which will result in
performance degradation of the executing application. When data are compressed,
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it will require more time to restart the application due to decompression time.
2.7 Survey of Checkpoint/Restart Facilities
A number of surveys of checkpoint/restart facilities have been carried out, such as
checkpoint.org [85], Kalaiselvi and Rajaraman [67], Byoung-Jip [86], Roman [61],
Elnozahy et al [16], and Maloney and Goscinski [64]. None presents summarised
information of currently available facilities that would easily aid research in this
area. Hence, we summarise and tabulate our findings in Appendix A, Table A.2.
This provides an overview of existing checkpoint/restart facilities that have been
proposed by researchers for different computing platforms (the website addresses
of the checkpoint facilities surveyed are included in the table). The criteria used
in this survey were based on the rollback-recovery feature requirements for HPC
systems discussed above. Table A.2 is concise and includes information that
provides the HPC checkpointing research community with a good overview of
the systems that have been proposed. The selected checkpoint/restart facilities
covered include recent work that is currently widely used.
2.8 Summary
In this chapter, we have provided an overview and analysis of failure rates of
HPC systems. Although it is difficult to determine the single most common root
cause of failure, we also conclude that computation-intensive applications are most
frequently interrupted by hardware failures, software failures or human error. We
conclude that a good fault tolerance mechanism should be able to mitigate or, in
39
2.8 Summary
some cases, even eliminate the consequences of failure. We have surveyed fault
tolerance mechanisms (redundancy, migration, failure masking and recovery) for
HPC and identified the pros and cons of each technique.
Recovery techniques are discussed in detail, and over 20 checkpoint/restart
facilities have been surveyed. Research efforts directed at reducing the time for
saving the checkpoint in persistent storage are presented. The rollback feature
requirements that were identified are used to evaluate them and the results are
provided in a tabular format for ease of reference. The web site of each surveyed
checkpoint/restart facility is also provided for further investigation.
While much work has been done on fault tolerance in traditional HPC systems
[77, 44, 13, 45], in particular on checkpoint and restart techniques [16, 61],
recent publications [10, 23, 87, 88] have shown that present fault tolerance (e.g.,
checkpoint and restart techniques) may not be effective in HPC systems with
more than 10,000 nodes.
Fault tolerance in the context of HPC systems in the cloud is essentially
different in nature because computation-intensive applications are executed in
virtual machines. Since cloud computing is relatively new, there was no available
published work on fault tolerance for HPC systems in the cloud, particularly when
HaaS is leased.
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HPC Systems in the Cloud,
Concepts and Architecture
Cloud computing is a new computing paradigm. In this chapter, we provide the
theoretical background to this thesis by defining the HPC in the cloud. We examine
relevant concepts, architecture, cloud services and fault tolerance issues, with
particular focus on HPC systems in the cloud. This chapter contains extracts from
our previous work [30, 29] but also includes refinements and new contributions.
3.1 Cloud Computing Architectures
The published literature [89, 18, 90, 91] and other sources [92] contain different
definitions of cloud computing. We adopt the definition of Foster et al. [91], which
captures the four-layer architecture of cloud computing:
“Cloud computing is a large-scale distributed computing paradigm that
is driven by economies of scale, in which a pool of abstracted, virtualized,
dynamically-scalable, managed computing power, storage, platforms,
and services are delivered on demand to external customers over the
Internet.”
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Cloud computing promises numerous benefits [18, 93], including no up-front
investment, scalability and greater research collaboration efficiency. It reduces
development and deployment time, staff (e.g., administrators) and hardware
requirements, which can result in significant cost saving. With cloud computing,
the need to plan ahead for provisioning Information Technology (IT) infrastructure
is greatly reduced, because it is difficult to predict IT service demand, which can
depend on unforeseeable events. HPC systems can also be more easily scaled in
cloud computing than in traditional HPC systems.
With the cloud computing pay-as-you-go pricing model, scientists and re-
searchers can lease cloud services such as Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) and
Hardware as a Service (HaaS) for computation-intensive applications. These ser-
vice models avoid job queuing, which is common in traditional HPC systems. The
price model is also attractive when compared to traditional HPC systems that
involve large capital investment, administrative issues and allocation policies. The
infrastructure costs mean that only large universities and research communities
can justify the expense of acquiring HPC systems.
A number of publications [94, 18, 95 96, 97] has shown that HPC systems
in the cloud are a good alternative to HPC systems. It is expected that more
computation-intensive applications will be deployed and run in HPC systems in
the cloud. As a case in point, the Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon
EC2) cluster recently appeared in the Top500 list [2], which suggests likely future
demand for HPC systems in the cloud.
The two major key players in cloud computing:
1. Cloud providers and
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2. Cloud users.
3.1.1 Cloud Providers
Cloud providers (e.g., Baremetalcloud [98] and Amazon EC2 [20]) create and
provide cloud services (hardware, virtual machines, storage, etc.) to which
consumers can subscribe, usually on a pay-as-you-go basis.
3.1.2 Cloud Users
Cloud users are organisations or individuals (e.g., scientists) who subscribe to
a selection of cloud services. This allows them either to operate their IT in the
cloud at a reduced cost or to create products (or perform experiments) that would
have been difficult without the possibilities inherent in the cloud.
3.2 Cloud Service Models
Cloud service models allow cloud providers to offer specialised services that can
represent significant savings for some users. The benefits of running computation-intensive
applications in HPC systems in the cloud include scalability, a pay-as-you-go
price model and easy access. Although there are different views on cloud
computing architectures [18, 90, 91, 99], we favour a four-layer architecture
for cloud computing that is consistent with the definition provided in [91] and
with the four major cloud computing service models [18, 100, 32]. The four-layer
architecture for cloud computing model gives a broad and conceptually simple yet
comprehensive view of major cloud services. This four-layer architecture for cloud
computing, shown in Figure 3.1, consists of:
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1. Software as a Service (SaaS)
2. Platform as a Service (PaaS)
3. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)
4. Hardware as a Service (HaaS).
	  
Hardware	  as	  a	  Service	  (HaaS)
(e.g.,	  server,	  CPU,	  storage,	  memory)
Provid
er	  (e.g
.	  Barem
etalclo
ud,	  So
ftLaye
r)
Infrastructure	  as	  a	  Service	  (IaaS)
(e.g.,	  Virtual	  Machine	  (VM),	  virtualised	  storage)
Provid
er	  (e.g
.,	  Ama
zon	  EC
2,	  Sale
sforce
.com)
Platform	  as	  a	  Service	  (PaaS)
(e.g.,	  platform	  for	  programming	  (e.g.,	  .net,	  java,	  python)
Provid
er	  (e.g
.,	  Goog
le	  app
	  engin
e,	  Ama
zon	  EC
2)
Software	  as	  a	  Service	  (SaaS)
(e.g.,	  application,	  web	  services,	  Gmail)
Provid
er	  (	  e.g
.,Sales
force.c
om,	  G
oogle)
Figure 3.1: Cloud computing architecture
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3.2.1 Software as a Service (SaaS)
SaaS is the highest abstraction level in the cloud. It offers cloud users ready-to-use
online applications that are already deployed in the cloud. This layer is hidden
from users and is managed by the SaaS providers. Users do not know where or how
these applications are deployed; they simply use them. SaaS cloud applications
can be accessed via the Internet with any Internet-ready device such as a laptop,
smartphone, or tablet. This enables relatively unsophisticated clients to perform
complex tasks by shifting the real work, transparently to the user, into the cloud.
Good examples of SaaS include Microsoft Word online provided by Microsoft and
the commonly used Gmail (email services) provided by Google.
3.2.2 Platform as a Service (PaaS)
PaaS provides cloud users with a fully configured and managed computing plat-
form for ready-to-run custom software developed by users. Each PaaS platform is
targeted to software developed in a specific programming language or software
framework and is ready to execute corresponding builds. Good examples of PaaS
are Microsoft Azure and Google App Engine [101, 102]. PaaS cloud users deploy
and run their software without the need to set up virtual machines and software
stacks or to think about scalability or clustering, and often without even knowing
how many computers or CPUs their application will run on. Fault tolerance is
provided for this level of service.
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3.2.3 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)
IaaS is similar to HaaS but virtual machines, rather than real hardware, are
rented out. IaaS cloud users have to install, configure, and maintain the virtual
machines they rent and are free to choose the operating system and software stack
they install in their virtual machines. Often IaaS users make use of pre-installed
and preconfigured virtual machine images supplied by their provider as base
installation. Cloud users of IaaS do not have root access to the hardware but only
to the virtual machines they lease. A good example of a cloud provider who offers
IaaS for HPC applications is Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2). Amazon
EC2 offers cluster compute instances for HPC applications. IaaS providers usually
provide fault tolerance to users.
3.2.4 Hardware as a Service (HaaS)
In this case, the cloud provider basically rents out ‘bare-metal’ hardware (e.g.,
server/host and storage). Notable HaaS providers include Baremetalcloud [98],
and SoftLayer [103]. Cloud users connect to HaaS via the Internet, install and
configure (e.g., virtual machines) the server or service they have leased. Cloud
users choose HaaS because it gives them full control of the server (host), operating
system, and software/hardware stack, as well as the number of virtual machines
they execute on it. Research communities lease HaaS for computation-intensive
and/or data-intensive applications and configure HPC systems according to their
needs. Consequently, computation-intensive applications that were traditionally
run on HPC systems can now be executed in the cloud. However, fault tolerance
is not provided at this service level.
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3.3 Types of Clouds
One way of classifying cloud computing is: public cloud, private cloud, community
cloud, and hybrid cloud [93, 104]. Each of these cloud types offers different ad-
vantages to cloud users. We briefly explain these types and the advantages that
each offers in relationship to HPC systems in the cloud. Figure 3.2 shows the
types of cloud computing with an illustrative diagram of an HPC system in the
cloud.
3.3.1 Public Cloud
In public cloud computing, computer resources (e.g., virtual machines, CPU,
storage, bandwidth, databases) are made available to the public by a cloud service
provider such as Amazon Web Services and Googles App Engine. These resources
may be provided free (e.g., Cloudo [105]) or based on a pay-as-you-go model,
such as the services from Amazon and Google. Public clouds promise the major
benefits of cloud computing [18]. In this thesis, we deal with HPC systems in the
cloud (public cloud).
3.3.2 Private Cloud
A private cloud is hosted in the data centre of a company and provides its cloud
services only to internal users or its partners. A private cloud may offer higher
security than public clouds and can provide cost savings if it utilises otherwise
unused capacity in an existing data centre [106]. Large organisations, including
large universities, can host HPC systems in their private cloud.
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3.3.3 Community Cloud
In community cloud computing, cloud services are provided to a specific group of
organisations that share common goals or missions (such as security requirements,
policy, or compliance considerations) [89]. The cost of running the cloud services is
shared among the participants. Community clouds can leverage service compliance
to provide highly secure cloud environments among trusted communities [107]).
Community clouds offer higher security and cost savings than public clouds, if
managed properly, but less security than a private cloud.
3.3.4 Hybrid Cloud
This is a combination of private, public, or community clouds, as shown in
Figure 3.2. Hybrid clouds allow organisations to find an optimal balance between
cost of IT operations and inherent security risks by running highly confidential
applications on private clouds and utilising public clouds for peak loads or other
computations. For example, a healthcare organisation may use a private cloud
managed by its internal IT unit to meet security requirements for healthcare
data and public cloud services to fulfill organisational goals with lower security
requirements. Hybrid clouds are still at an early stage of development, and
inter-operability among clouds is a major challenge that has to be overcome so
that users can manage their hybrid cloud environments without added complexity
with the very tools they use to manage their private clouds.
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3.4 HPC Systems in the Cloud
Cloud computing presents a significant opportunity for HPC systems. The price
model means that HPC systems are no longer limited to large organisations but are
also available to smaller enterprises, and even individuals, for computation-intensive
computation. An HPC system in the cloud is deployed on top of virtualisation
technology, as shown in Figure 3.3.
Virtualisation allows installation of multiple operating systems and software
stacks (virtual machines) on one physical computer, allowing them to execute
simultaneously but fully segregated from each other.
HPC in the cloud typically runs jobs (computation-intensive applications) and
other services (e.g., resource management and file system services) on a head node
and compute nodes using a Message Passing Interface (MPI) to communicate
between different nodes.
3.4.1 Head Node
The head node on an HPC system in the cloud is usually a virtual machine that is
configured to act as a point of contact between the HPC system and the outside
network. It is usually seen as the heart of the cluster (HPC system) and performs
the roles of job submission, network management, user login, access point to
compute nodes, and control. In theory, users do not need to access individual
compute nodes of an HPC system; rather, they depend on the head node and
the job submission and other resource management tools to monitor and retrieve
data and results. A head node failure may result in the loss of the application
and failure of the entire HPC system. The possibility of network partition and
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Figure 3.3: Host and Xen virtualization
how it impacts the notion of a head node is out of the scope covered in this thesis.
The interested reader is referred to [15].
3.4.2 Compute Nodes
A compute node in an HPC system in the cloud is essentially an independent
virtual machine configured to accept jobs from the head node and produce
corresponding results. In theory, only the head node has direct access to the
compute node. The head node may use secure protocol such as Secure Shell (SSH)
transport layer protocol [108] to connect to the compute node. Each compute
node running a computation-intensive application on HPC in the cloud is a single
point of failure for the HPC system; that is, failure of a compute node running
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a computation-intensive application may lead to loss of system and application
state.
3.4.3 Message Passing Interface
The Message Passing Interface (MPI) [109] is the common parallel programming
industry standard on which most parallel applications are written. With MPI,
distributed and parallel virtual machines with distributed memories on HPC
systems in the cloud communicate and share their data with other virtual machines
by sending and receiving messages. MPI (e.g., OpenMPI, MPICH) provides two
modes of operation: running or failed. That is, it follows the fail-stop model.
An example of MPI application is Portable, Extensible Toolkit for Scientific
Computation (PETSc) [110] that is used for modelling in scientific applications
such as acoustics, aerodynamics, brain surgery, medical imaging, ocean dynamics
and oil recovery. In this thesis we used OpenMPI implementation [111] because
OpenMPI is an open source MPI-2 implementation that is widely used by HPC
community across all platform. OpenMPI is developed and maintained by a
collaboration of academic, research and industry partners.
3.4.4 Fail-stop Model
The fail-stop model assumes that systems components (e.g., compute node, pro-
cessor) have failed completely when they are not producing output, have halted,
restarted or stopped. A heart-beat mechanism is commonly used to detect fail-
ures. Most HPC systems assume a fail-stop model [55]. MPI applications running
in HPC systems in the cloud can fail at any point of execution due to the hard-
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ware, software and virtual machines that make up HPC systems in the cloud.
This thesis focuses on the fail-stop model because HPC systems in the cloud,
particularly when HaaS is leased, do not have fault tolerance in place. Fail-stop
model is the most commonly experienced failure in HPC systems [15]
3.4.5 Virtualisation
Virtualisation is the enabling technology for HPC systems in the cloud. Virtualisation
allows installation of multiple operating systems and software stacks (virtual
machines) on physical computers (hosts) and configured virtual machines to form
HPC systems in the cloud. There are several competing virtualisation technologies,
most notably Xen [112] and the Linux Kernel Virtual Machine (KVM) [113]. In
this study we used Xen virtualisation technology because of its features, which
are briefly described below.
Xen hypervisor[112] is an open-source industrial standard virtualisation
technology that is widely used by researchers [114]. As shown in Figure 3.3,
Xen hypervisor provides a low level interaction between virtual machines usually
called DomainU (guest machine), and the physical hardware. Domain0 or the
control domain is the virtual host environment. Xen hypervisor supports full
virtualisation and para-virtualization modes. The full virtualisation mode allows
virtual machines to run unmodified operating systems (e.g., Windows XP), but
the hardware must support hardware-assisted virtualisation technology. Para-
virtualisation allows the guest operating system to be modified for performance
reasons [114].
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3.5 Challenges for HPC Systems in the Cloud
In addition to the challenges mentioned in Chapter 1, HPC systems in the cloud
face two additional challenges:
1. System Reliability
2. Cost
3.5.1 System Reliability
With an increase in the number of processors, integrated circuit sockets and
compute nodes, the overall system Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) in
large-scale HPC systems may typically be reduced to just a few hours [115, 11,
23].
MTBF is a primary measure of system reliability and is defined as the
probability that the system performs without deviations from agreed-upon behaviour
for a specific period of time [116]. The reliability of a component is given as
Reliability function = n(t)
N
= failure free elementsnumber of elements at time=0 (3.1)
The reliability of elements connected in series
Rs =
m∏
n=1
e−λit (3.2)
and, the reliability of elements connected in parallel is given as
Rp = 1−
m∏
n=1
(1− e−λit) (3.3)
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If we assume that in a system of m components, the MTBF of any component i
is independent of all other components, the reliability R of the system is
R = 1
MTBF1
+ 1
MTBF2
+ ...+ 1
MTBFm
(3.4)
If MTBF1 = MTBF2 = ... = MTBFm then,
R = component MTBF
m
(3.5)
Availability is the degree to which a system or component is operational and able
to perform its designed function [87].
Availability
(MTBF +MTTR) (3.6)
where MTTR = Mean Time To Repair
For example, following a certain threshold, in a system with a large number of
components, the system reliability can decrease, as illustrated in Figure 3.4. The
diagram also shows how the value of the MTBF affects reliability (e.g., MTBFs of
100,000 and 1,000,000 hours).
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Figure 3.4: Reliability levels of two systems with MTBF of 105 and 106 as a
function of the number of nodes
HPC applications deployed in cloud environments run on virtual machines,
which are more likely to fail due to resource sharing and contention. Therefore,
HPC systems in the cloud face three major types of failures;
1. Hardware failures
2. Software failures
3. Virtual machine failures
3.5.2 Cost
The price model for HPC systems in the cloud is attractive, particularly when
compared to traditional HPC systems that require huge investments of capital and
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involve administrative issues and allocation policies. However, the cost of running
HPC application on HPC systems in the cloud may be high if the cloud services
are not well understood or if non-cost-effective cloud services are chosen. If the
dollar cost of running HPC applications in the cloud (when a non-cost-effective
cloud service is chosen) is high compared to that of a traditional HPC system,
then the benefits of running computation-intensive applications on the cloud may
not be realised. HPC systems research communities are concerned about the cost
and computational performance of different cloud services.
3.6 Summary
This chapter has presented the conceptual background of the types of HPC sys-
tems in the cloud that are the subject of this thesis. We have explained cloud
computing architectures, described their benefits and identified the two main
categories of cloud players (cloud providers and cloud users). We have explained
the various cloud service models, SaaS, PaaS, IaaS and HaaS, discussed their
challenges with respect to HPC systems in the cloud, and presented the four types
of cloud computing available for HPC systems.
HPC systems in the cloud usually consist of a head node and compute nodes.
The head node and compute nodes are virtual machines configured to fit their
roles. The head node usually handles the user login, resource management, jobs
assignment and network file system. Compute nodes are normally accessed through
the head node. Compute nodes perform the computation-intensive job assigned
by the head and produce results. The head node and compute nodes communicate
through the Message Passing Interface. Failures of the head node and/or compute
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node(s) commonly lead to a failure of the HPC system.
We also identified two additional challenges: system reliability (hardware fail-
ures, software failures and virtual machine failures) and cost (what cloud service
is cost effective for HPC systems?). This thesis addresses cost, reliability and the
other HPC challenges identified in Chapter 1.
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Chapter 4
Proactive Fault Tolerance
Approach to HPC Systems in the
Cloud
This chapter describes a proactive fault tolerance approach to HPC systems in the
cloud. It presents an account of our design and implementation approaches, cost
model, mathematical analysis and test results. Some of the content is extracted
from our earlier work [31, 29], with some additions and modifications.
4.1 Introduction
HPC systems are currently used by scientists and researchers in both industry
and university laboratories. Computation-intensive applications requiring large
amounts of computing power are executed in HPC systems. Fields of application
[117, 4, 118] of HPC systems are shown in Table 4.1. The table shows that HPC
system has wide range of applications.
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Table 4.1: HPC systems applications
Field Application
Medicine
Medical imaging (e.g., 3D ultrasound real-time X-ray)
Monitoring brain activities (e.g., Magneto Encephalography
(MEG))
Brain data analysis
Financial
Investment decision
Derivatives trading
Monte Carlo simulations
Pharmaceutical
Molecular modelling
Drug discovery
Drug design
Oil and Gas
Reservoir modelling and simulation
Deep oil recovery
3D imaging processing
Upstream oil and gas exploration
Bioinformatics
Storing, retrieving large data set
Development of genetic algorithms
Statistical analysis of large data set
Image processing, sequence analysis, sequence alignments
Weather
Climate change
Weather forecast
Big data analysis
Meteorology
Research
Nuclear weapons research
Auto crash simulations
Aerodynamics research
In general, most of these are parallel and/or distributed applications that are
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computation-intensive. Drug recovery processes that can take up to 15 years from
compound synthesis in the pharmaceutical laboratory to drug production can
be reduced to a few weeks with HPC systems [4]. Because HPC systems usually
require huge investment capital in hardware [2]. Scientists and researchers must
sometimes wait in long queues to access shared HPC systems.
Amazon EC2 [20] and recent publications [119, 120, 19] have shown that HPC
systems in the cloud are a good alternative for computation-intensive applications
that are usually executed in traditional HPC systems. Cloud service providers,
however, do not manage the virtual machines provided on the HaaS. Due to the
large number of virtual machines and electronic components in HPC systems in the
cloud, any fault during the execution would result in re-running the applications,
which costs time, money and energy. Fault tolerance is one of the major challenges
that HPC systems in the cloud face today, particularly when HaaS is leased.
Moreover, HPC applications deployed in cloud environments run on virtual
machines, which are more likely to fail due to resource sharing and contention.
Therefore, fault tolerance technology is particularly important for HPC applica-
tions running in cloud environments, because it can prevent restarting, thereby
reducing operational costs and energy consumption.
Hardware redundancy is used to provide fault tolerance to hardware failures.
In the event of hardware failure of one component, other components that are in
good working order continue to perform until the failed part is replaced. With
hardware redundancy fault tolerance techniques, redundant compute nodes are
added to make it possible for the HPC systems to tolerate failures [121, 14, 122].
Riesen et al proposed a concept of redundant computing for HPC systems in
[14]. In redundant computing, all compute nodes are replicated. Hsieh [123]
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proposed an optimal task allocation and hardware redundancy policy, while [122]
and [121] proposed a fixed-number of hardware redundancy schemes to achieve
higher reliability in HPC systems. Consequently, the dollar cost of running
computation-intensive application in the cloud with redundant computing fault
tolerance will be high.
A reactive fault tolerance technique is commonly used for computation-intensive
applications in classical grid computing through checkpoints and restart [124, 125].
However, it usually increases the wall clock execution time of HPC applications.
Reactive fault tolerance techniques allow computation-intensive applications
(which may take hours or days to complete) to log their intermediate results and
states at checkpoints during their execution. Once a failure occurs, the application
can be restarted from the checkpoint prior to the point of failure, rather than
from the beginning. The frequency at which a component or application fails is
an important measure in fault tolerance. It has been predicted that in peta-scale
computing the MTBF is short; i.e., an application running on a peta-scale system
will be interrupted by failure more often, with the MTBF decreasing as the
reciprocal of the number of nodes [10, 23, 11].
In this study, we develop a proactive fault tolerance approach to HPC systems
in the cloud to reduce the wall clock execution time in the presence of faults and
dollar cost of running computation-intensive application. In particular, we make
the following contributions:
1. We develop a generic fault tolerance algorithm for HPC systems in the cloud
that does not rely on a leased spare node prior to prediction of a hardware
failure.
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2. We analyse and compare the dollar costs of four different fault tolerance
solutions for running computation-intensive applications: (a) an ideal fully
reliable system (reliability = 1), (b) a fault tolerance checkpoint scheme, (c)
a migration-based scheme, and (d) the scheme we proposed. Our analysis
allows HPC users leasing HaaS from a service provider to select a particular
fault tolerance policy in line with budget and plans.
3. We derive a cost model for executing computation-intensive applications on
HPC systems in the cloud. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
detailed cost model for executing computation-intensive application on HPC
systems in the cloud particularly when HaaS is leased.
4. We analyse the dollar cost of provisioning spare nodes to assess the value of
our approach.
4.2 Benefit of HaaS
This study focuses on Hardware as a Service (HaaS) because of the benefits
HaaS offers [31]. In HaaS, the cloud provider basically rents out ‘bare-bones’
hardware (e.g., server/host and data). Cloud users connect to this service via
the Internet, install and configure (e.g., VMs) the server they have leased. Cloud
users choose HaaS because it gives them full control of the server, operating
system, and software stack, as well as the number of VMs they execute on it.
Research communities can easily lease HaaS for computation-intensive and/or
data-intensive applications and configure HPC systems according to their needs.
It has been shown that HaaS is a cost effective service for HPC systems in the
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cloud [31].
4.3 Proactive Fault Tolerance for HPC Systems
in the Cloud
The cloud provides pools of computing resources as services via the Internet using
a pay-as-you-go price model that eliminates initial costly capital investments in
hardware and infrastructure procurement. Until recently, HPC systems have
been out of the reach of most research communities. Research and academic
communities can now leverage the benefits of the cloud price model for their
computation-intensive applications that traditionally run in dedicated HPC
environments. HaaS providers lease out the ‘bare bone’ hardware, such as
computers, data servers, and storage, while cloud users are responsible for
configuring and maintaining the services. Performance and other types of trade-off
can be more easily made when there is more complete control of the applications
that execute in the HPC environment (both software and hardware stacks). Cloud
service providers do not commonly provide fault tolerance mechanisms at this
level.
Proactive fault tolerance uses an avoidance mechanism to tolerate faults. It
achieves this by relying on a system log and health monitoring facilities. The
system log and health monitoring provide information about the hardware/software
state [126]. Health monitoring of hardware has recently attracted attention in
fault tolerance communities because sensors are installed on modern hardware to
monitor, for example, the processor temperature and fan speeds. This information
is used to predict future failures.
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Our proactive fault tolerance for HPC systems in the cloud requires four types
of modules:
1. Monitoring module with lm-sensors
2. Failure predictor
3. Proactive fault tolerance policy module
4. Controller module.
These are explained in the following sections:
4.3.1 Monitoring Module with Lm-sensors
Many hardware failures can be predicted/detected in recent processors. Sensors
installed in modern processors can be used to monitor CPU temperature, fan speeds
and other parameters [127, 126]. Variations in the monitored parameters can
adversely affect the performance and reliability of systems. We use the lm-sensors
[128] package that provides tools, libraries, and drivers for monitoring these
parameters. The libsensors library is used to access the values of the monitored
parameters. It provides user-space support for the hardware monitoring drivers
and console tools that report sensor readings. Lm-sensors allows easy setting
of sensor limits. We selected lm-sensors because most HPC systems run Linux,
and lm-sensors use Linux operating system kernel drivers. We used lm-sensors
to develop FTDaemon which can be easily deployed on an HPC system in the
cloud. Our methods, however, may easily be generalised to other operating system
platforms.
Centrally monitoring the health of all the nodes in an HPC system with over
100,000 processors would a impose heavy overhead on the network as well as on the
65
4.3 Proactive Fault Tolerance for HPC Systems in the Cloud
HPC system. Therefore, we have designed FTDaemon to reduce the monitoring
overhead, by having each node/host monitor its hardware by periodically reading
its parameters. In our prototype, the FTDaemon running on each computing
node/host collects lm-sensors information (e.g., processor temperature) every 600
milliseconds (the user can also set this interval to a higher value). An alarm is
triggered whenever the monitored parameters exceed the maximum set values. The
alarm prompts the reading of the sensors’ values and a computation to determine
if failure is likely to occur.
4.3.2 Failure Predictor
The FTDaemon runs on each host in user space. It uses rule-based prediction
techniques [129, 130, 131], in which the future failure situation is determined by
periodically reading the sensors’ values. The current values are compared against
the set maximum operating conditions obtained from sensor data repository.
The sensor data repository provides reliability information on all sensors
installed on the system (e.g., temperature, fan speed and voltage). The basic
idea in reliability information provided in the sensor data repository, derived
from probability theory, is that a given component such as a CPU has operating
conditions (normal, maximum and critical values) which, if violated, may result
in the failure of the CPU [116]. Severity weight values are used to determine
the severity level, as shown in Table 4.2. All the monitored sensors events are
assigned a severity weight of -1, 0, 1 or 2 to represent normal, maximum, critical
and error respectively. The info events are generated when the sensor is operating
at normal state. The warning event is associated with maximum state value while
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the critical event is associated with prediction of future failure. The error reading
is associated with sensor data that are not available. For example, when the
predictor wants to read the temperature of CPU4 and this is not available, it
generates an error.
Table 4.2: Lm-senors generated events
Sensor State Severity weight Severity level
Normal -1 Info
Maximum 0 Warning
Critical 1 Critical
Error 2 Error reading
The result obtained by comparing the current sensor’s values with maximum
set thresholds is used to determine if a failure is likely to occur soon. The predictor
has a vector input of the four sensors: temperature T, voltage V and fan speed
F; and CPU utilisation C. We chose to monitor CPU temperature, voltage, fan
speed and CPU utilisation because high values of these parameters adversely
affect performance of the HPC systems which may results to system failure. For
example, overheating of CPU temperature would lead to automatic shutdown
of CPU [39]. The combination of the four parameters increases positive failure
prediction [132, 133]. Figure 4.2 illustrates our failure predictor model.
We use set theory [134] and associate the input valuables. The possible severity
weight values that can be obtained from sensors’ reading can be represented as:
• Ti ∈ {-1, 0, 1, 2}
• Fi ∈ {-1, 0, 1, 2}
67
4.3 Proactive Fault Tolerance for HPC Systems in the Cloud
• Vi ∈ {-1, 0, 1, 2}
• Ci ∈ {-1, 0, 1, 2}
	  
Ti
Vi
Fi
Ci
Computation αc
Figure 4.1: Rule-based predictor model
The sample algorithm 1 monitors the CPU temperature. The CPU fan speed,
CPU voltage and CPU utilisation are monitored with a similar algorithm. In
formulating the prediction rules, we use Boolean function which can be represented
with two values: 0 and 1 to represent warning and critical operating state. Applying
the Boolean function, a potential failure is predicted when three or four of the
four CPU parameters are operating in a critical state. Similarly, a warning
message is issued when two of the monitored parameters are in critical states. The
construction of the prediction rule is shown in Appendix A, Table A.1. The critical
operating condition occurs when three of the measured parameters are operating
at critical states. The equivalent representations for future failure prediction and
warning state are shown below using set theory [134] and a fault tree technique
[135]:
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αc = Future failure state =

Tci∩Vci∩Fci∩Cci
(Tci∩Vci∩Fci)∪Cci
(Tci∩Vci∩Cci)∪Fci
(Tci∩Fci∩Cci)∪Vci
(Vci∩Fci∩Cci)∪Tci
where:
• Tci = CPU critical temperature
• Vci = CPU critical voltage
• Fci = CPU critical fan speed
• Cci = CPU critical utilisation
For warning state:
αw = Warning State =

Twi∩Vwi
Vwi∩Cwi
Cwi∩Fwi
Twi∩Cwi
Twi∩Fwi
where:
• Twi = CPU maximum reliable temperature
• Vwi = CPU maximum reliable voltage
• Twi = CPU maximum reliable fan speed
• Cwi = CPU maximum reliable utilisation
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Algorithm 1
1: set timer TRUE
2: while timer TRUE # for all the FTDaemon running on the computer hosts
3: do
4: read sensor value Ti; # CPU temperature
5: compute for CiTi; # CiTi = measured variables
# eg CPU temperature, voltage, fan speed and utilisation.
# Compute the operating state
6: if CiTi = 0 or 1 then; # If operating at maximum or critical state exit
7: break
4.3.3 Proactive Fault Tolerance Policy
The goal of the proactive fault tolerance policy is to reduce the impact of failure on
the execution of a computation-intensive application. We defined and implemented
three policies:
1. Lease an additional node/host from the service provider
2. Relinquish the unhealthy node
3. Notify the administrator to take action.
When failure is predicted, the FTDaemon can proceed either to lease an
additional host or to inform the administrator. The default policy is to lease an
additional host/server and to log the details of the newly leased host with the
head host. The head host maintains a database of all hosts. The functionality
of the head host is transferred to newly leased host in the event of head host
being predicted to fail. The ‘relinquish the unhealthy host policy’ is executed
after migration of virtual machines from the unhealthy to the newly leased host.
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4.3.4 The Controller Module
The controller module implements the policies listed above. A controller module is
installed on all hosts. This technique provides future failure location information
and allows immediate action by the host that is about to fail. The FTDaemon
invokes this controller module when a failure is predicted. The controller module
contacts the service provider and provides the service provider with the credentials
(e.g., user name and password) that are required in the leasing process. FTDaemon
collects the required credentials from the user during the startup of FTDaemon.
Our implementation requires only the user name and the password,although more
credentials information can be added.
After leasing the additional host, the controller module carries out live
migration of the virtual machines from the unhealthy host to the newly leased
host. It also logs the details of the additional node with the head host. On
completion of migration of the virtual machines, the controller module also installs
the FTDaemon on the newly leased host.
Figure 4.3 shows the architecture of our system. Xen hypervisor is a virtualisation
software which is installed on each of the host. This allows multiple para-virtualised
Operating Systems (OS) to be installed on each host. A para-virtualised OS
is an operating system which its kernel is modified to work in virtual machine
[136]. The Dom00,. . . , Dom0n, usually called domain zeros are the host operating
systems. They run the management console and have special privileges to access
the hardware. FTDaemon runs on the host operating systems. The backend and
FTDaemon, as shown in Figure 4.3, communicate to the hardware through the
drivers. The DomU0,. . . , DomUn (unprivileged domains) are the guest virtual
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machines. The guest VMs (compute nodes) are configured to form a cluster
with head node and compute nodes. The guest virtual machines execute the
computation-intensive applications.
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Figure 4.2: System architecture
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4.4 Proactive Fault Tolerance Algorithm
In this section, we describe our algorithm and provide a quantitative analysis of
its properties. The current information from the sensors is used to determine
the state of monitored parameters. The algorithm predicts future failure, and
takes action to reduce the impact of failure on the application. Finally, it also
relinquishes the unhealthy node and installs an FTDaemon on the newly leased
node. Algorithm 2 is given as follows:
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Algorithm 2
# FTDaemon running on all host Ci(i = 0, 1,. . . , n);
# Monitored parameters: V= temperature, fan speed, voltages and utilization;
# Variables = operating conditions Vw: weight (-1, 0, 1, 2);
# where:
#-1 = operating at normal values of all parameters; V;
# 0 = operating at max values of one or more parameters
# 1 = operating at critical value;
# 2 = error value;
# αw = Warning State;
# αc = Future failure State;
# Compute for host current state and take action;
# if future failure is predicted;
1: FTDaemon:
2: begin
3: record the hostname of all guest VMs active on host Ci;
4: get critical values of CiV;
5: set timer TRUE;
6: while TRUE do;
7: read parameters CiV;
8: compute for severity weight values;
9: compute for αc and αw;
10: if αc = 1 then;
11: break; # exit loop
12: elseif αw = 1;
13: send warning message;
14: delay;
15: else
16: check if alarm trigger is received;
17: end while;
18: controller module:
19: lease additional host;
20: live migration of <VM1, . . . , VMn >;
21: install FTDaemon on newly leased host;
22: send details of newly leased host to head host;
23: relinquish the unhealthy host;
24: end
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4.4.1 Cost Model
We develop a cost model to show that our proposed solution is a cost-oriented
approach. Cost-oriented fault tolerance for HPC systems in the cloud is particularly
important because a high dollar cost would discourage scientists and researchers
from using HPC systems in the cloud. A good understanding of cost implications
and reliability of HPC systems in the cloud enables users to choose a suitable
fault tolerance strategy at a minimum dollar cost in running the application in the
cloud environment. From the cost management viewpoint, it is a tool used to cut
costs and to choose fault tolerance in line with a project’s budget and strategy. It
also helps to choose cloud computing resources to achieve a particular reliability
level, and compare alternative fault tolerance solutions. We derive a cost model
Cca for running computation-intensive applications on HPC systems in the cloud.
The cost can be determined with the following cloud computing parameters [22,
18, 123, 121, 122]:
• Installation/configuration cost Cin
• Execution cost Ce
• Communication cost Cc
• Storage cost Cs
• Redundancy cost Cr
• Failure cost Cf
Hence, we have;
Cca = Cin + Ce + Cc + Cs + Cr + Cf (4.1)
Below, we briefly discuss the above parameters and show how we derive the cost
model.
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4.4.2 Installation/Configuration Cost
To derive the cost-oriented fault tolerance model, we include the installation
and/or configuration cost. The installation and/or configuration cost has been
overlooked in the past [18, 22]. There are few HPC systems in the cloud services
that do not require installation and configuration of the necessary software tools
before running application. The level of installation and configuration depends on
the cloud services leased and the application’s requirements. For instance, when
HaaS is leased from a service provider, it is the sole responsibility of the user to
set up the HPC system environment, install and configure the HPC system tools
in line with the computation-intensive application’s requirements. We model the
installation and configuration cost as;
Cin = C0 +
m∑
g=1
Cig +
n∑
h=1
Cih (4.2)
where:
C0 is the initial/fixed cost to set up a “standard” HPC system environment in a
cloud (defined number of computer nodes in HPC system), Cig (g = 1, 2, 3,. . . ,
m) is the set up unit cost of each computing node when it exceeds the “standard”,
while Cih (h = 1, 2, 3,. . . , n) is the unit cost to setup and configure the storage
resources. In most HPC systems, performance tests are typically carried out with
4 to 32 compute nodes. The “standard” we used here are 32 compute nodes, the
linux operating system and a MPI environment. For scalability analysis we may
require much larger systems consisting of more than 1000 nodes.
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4.4.3 Execution Cost
The execution cost Ce, is defined as the cost incurred during the execution of the
computation-intensive application with computation resources (CPU and RAM)
in the cloud. The execution cost is usually charged by the hour or month. This
can be represented as the product of the cost of leased host and the time to
complete execution of computation-intensive application in HPC systems in the
cloud. We can represent the execution cost as:
Ce =
p∑
i=1
Cei.Eti (4.3)
where:
Cei is cost per host, i = 1, 2, 3,. . . , p is the number of hosts used to set up the
HPC systems in the cloud for the computation-intensive application. Eti is the
execution time of the computation-intensive application in the HPC system with
host i.
4.4.4 Communication Cost
The communication cost is the cost associated with transferring data into its
cloud storage resources and the cost associated with transferring data out of
its cloud storage resources. Some cloud providers, for example, Baremetalcloud
[98] do not charge for communication within the same cloud. Consequently, the
communication cost is directly proportional to the rate at which data are moved
in and out of the cloud storage resources. For data intensive applications, this
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cost maybe high [22]. The model for the communication cost is as follows:
Cc =
q∑
j=1
Cincj +
r∑
k=1
Coutck (4.4)
where:
Cincj (j = 1, 2, 3,. . . , q) is the cost associated with transferring q bytes into the cloud
storage system. Coutck (k = 1, 2, 3,. . . , r) is the cost associated with transferring r
bytes out of the cloud storage system.
4.4.5 Storage Cost
There is a cost associated with cloud storage utilisation. At the time of writing of
this thesis, the cost for cloud storage HaaS is usually around 3.5 cents per GB
per month [98]. We model the storage cost with the following;
Cs =
s∑
l=1
Csl.Ctl (4.5)
where:
Csl (l = 1, 2, 3,. . . , s) is the cost associated with s cloud storage system. Ctl, is
the time associated with usage of the s storage system per GB.
4.4.6 Redundancy Cost
Redundancy is commonly used in HPC systems to improve reliability. For instance,
in the fault tolerance techniques we investigated [127], virtual machines are
migrated from unhealthy hosts to redundant hosts when a future failure of host
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is predicted. In redundant computing (discussed in section 4.1 above), compute
nodes are replicated twice. Redundant compute nodes may increase the reliability
of HPC systems but at the same time increase the cost of running applications
in the cloud. The cost of providing redundant hosts can be expressed with the
following equation. We assume that the redundant hosts are in parallel with
virtual machine hosts Dom00,. . . , Dom0n.
Cr =
v∑
u=1
Cru.Ctu (4.6)
where:
Cru (u= 1, 2, 3,. . . , v) is the cost associated with the v number of redundant
hosts. t is the time associated with the usage of the v compute hosts running
virtual machines.
4.4.7 Failure Cost
It is unlikely that an HPC system in the cloud would achieve a reliability value of
1. This may be attributed to the number of shared resources comprising hardware
components, communication links and virtual machines. Different fault tolerance
approaches tend to reduce this cost. We factor failure cost into the cost-oriented
fault tolerance model. Based on MPI model, we assume that failures of compute
hosts are statistically independent, hence, compute hosts are in either operational
or failed states. The failure cost associated with not using fault tolerance or
using appropriate fault tolerance techniques is high, therefore, failure cannot be
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neglected in the cost model.
Cf = Closs[1−Rx] (4.7)
where:
Rx is the HPC system reliability, while Closs can be obtained from a failure data
repository such as CFDR [3] or can be predicted by an expert as proposed in [121]
Substituting equations (4.2), (4.3), (4.4), (4.5), (4.6) and (4.7) into equation
(4.1), the total cost for running computation-intensive application in HPC systems
in the cloud Cca is expressed by the following:
Cca = C0 +
m∑
g=1
Cig +
n∑
h=1
Cih +
p∑
i=1
Cei.Eti +
q∑
j=1
Cincj +
r∑
k=1
Coutck
+
s∑
l=1
C(ss)l.Ctl +
v∑
u=1
Cru.Ctu + Closs[1−Rx] (4.8)
From equation (4.8) we can deduce the following:
1. Compute host redundancy fault tolerance techniques that are commonly used
in traditional HPC systems increase the cost of running computation-intensive
applications in HPC systems in the cloud.
2. Using checkpoint and restart fault tolerance techniques in HPC system in
the cloud improves the reliability of the HPC systems; however, the cost of
running the computation-intensive application increases. This is attributed
to the increase in the wall clock execution time of the application caused by
checkpoint and restart fault tolerance techniques. This is in line with existing
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results on the effect of checkpoint and restart fault tolerance techniques [26]
3. Live migration of virtual machines from unhealthy hosts to redundant hosts
can improve the reliability of HPC systems and reduce the cost of running
computation-intensive applications if the spare hosts are not provided in
advance, that is, before a failure prediction is made [31, 87].
4.4.8 Quantitative Analysis
Case 1:
We first analyse the total dollar cost of the proactive fault tolerance algorithm used
in [127] using equation (4.8), when a spare host is provisioned ahead of prediction
of failure and algorithm proposed in redundant computing [14]. With these models
the cost of running computation-intensive applications in HPC systems in the
cloud will be relatively high, due to the cost of the spare nodes/hosts. The cost in
redundant computing would be twice that of the compute hosts used to execute
computation-intensive application. The cost using the algorithm proposed in [127]
has been computed and is shown in Figure 4.4. The cost implication of this model
is shown in case 2.
Case 2:
A configuration is established for which the leased host is operating in normal
state (as described above). In this state, there is no need to keep a spare host.
From observations and records, HPC systems operate in this region most of the
time, except when failure is about to occur (when a host enters its critical state
(i.e., αw = 1)). As already stated eariler, critical state is established when three of
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prediction parameters are operating at critical states, from our observation system
failure mostly occur at this state. Only in this state does the controller model
lease an additional node/host from the service provider as well as relinquish the
unhealthy one. We assume that the time window from prediction of host failure
to actual failure is enough to migrate virtual machines from the unhealthy host
to the newly leased host based on similar experiments [130]. For failures that
occur without prior time window warning, for example, power failure, reactive
fault tolerance technique such as checkpoint/restart is used to recover from such
failure. Using equation (4.8), the operating cost of the spare node/host is close to
zero, because the unhealthy host is relinquished immediately after migration of
the virtual machines. Our experimental results show that provision of a node/host
and live migration of virtual machines varies between 20 seconds and 60 seconds
on our test system.
Cr =
v∑
u=1
Cu.Rtu ≈ 0 (4.9)
Therefore:
Cca = C0 +
m∑
g=1
Cig +
n∑
h=1
Cih +
p∑
i=1
Cei.Eti +
q∑
j=1
Cinjh +
r∑
k=1
Coutck
+
s∑
l=1
Csl.Ctl + Closs[1−Rx] (4.10)
There is a significant dollar saving of about 20% with our model as can be seen by
comparing Equations (4.8) and (4.10). We further show the significant difference
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with the cost model in the next section.
4.5 Evaluation
We evaluate the wall clock execution time in the presence of faults and the dollar
cost of providing spare node in advance as it is applied in traditional HPC systems
using our proposed technique (Algorithm 2). We assume that all corresponding
factors in equations (4.8) and (4.10) are the same.
We have experimented with the characteristics of our fault tolerance design
in a real cloud environment. We leased two to sixteen servers/hosts from a
cloud service provider of HaaS [98]. Each compute host/server had the following
configuration; Intel Dual Xeon core processor (2 x 3.5GHz), 2GB memory, PC3200
3.5 SCSI 10000rpm and 100GB network drive using Internet Small Computer
System Interface (iSCSI) SAN configuration [137]. The hosts/servers use Local
Area Network (LAN) connections. Details of the HaaS provided by the cloud
service provider can be found in [98].
We installed Xen hypervisor [112] on each of the hosts. Therefore Xen
hypervisor runs on all the hosts as shown in Figure 4.3. Xen hypervisor is an open
source, industrial standard virtualisation technology. The Linux operating system
runs on top of the Xen hypervisor. We installed a para-virtualised guest operating
system on the hosts. A para-virtualised operating system uses a modified kernel,
and reduces the size of the image.
Wall clock execution time:
For the experiment to determine the wall clock execution time, each host is
con-figured to host 1 to 4 virtual machines (compute node). Each virtual machine
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is configured to have one processor, 250MB memory and 5GB hard drive. With
the 4 hosts/servers we leased, we formed a cluster of 16 compute nodes to test
our algorithm.
We conducted three sets of experiments with 2, 4, 8, and 16 nodes per cluster.
We ran a HPC application, the High Performance Linpack benchmark (HPL)
[138] in an OpenMPI [111] environment. HPL is widely used in benchmarking
Top500 supercomputing. OpenMPI is an open source implementation of MPI-2.
We executed the HPL application with four different problem sizes of 2000,
4000, 6000 and 8000 on 2, 4, 8, and 16 nodes respectively. The wall clock execution
time of each the problem size was recorded without checkpoint, with checkpoint
(the checkpoint and restart solution that is package in OpenMPI implementation
[139, 17]), and with the FTDaemon (our proposed solution). For the tests with
checkpoints, the number of checkpoints used is shown in Table 4.4, which also
shows the number of live migration associated with each problem size. We observed
that our algorithm significantly improved application resiliency at a reduced cost
compared to more common reactive approaches. This helps to determine the effect
of checkpointing on computation-intensive applications running in a cloud.
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Table 4.3: HPL with different problem sizes and nodes
HPL
Problem
Sizes
Number
of Nodes
Number of
Checkpoints
Number
of
Migrations
2000 2 2 2
4000 4 3 3
6000 8 4 4
8000 16 6 6
The time to lease and provision a node is about 18 seconds. The average
migration down time obtained from our experiment was 0.315 seconds. The
performance results are shown in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.3: Performance of HPL benchmarking without checkpointing, with
checkpointing, and with FTDaemon.
Cost Analysis:
To show that our proposed fault tolerance solution is a cost-oriented approach,
we conducted four sets of experiments with 2, 4, 8, 16 and 32 nodes per cluster.
We ran a real HPC application, the High Performance Linpack benchmark (HPL)
[138] in an OpenMPI environment.
We executed the HPL application with five different problem sizes of 2,000,
4,000, 6,000, 8,000 and 10,000 on 2, 4, 8, 16 and 32 nodes respectively. The wall
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clock execution time of each problem size was recorded when run:
1. without checkpoints (assume no fault tolerance provided and no fault
occurred during execution),
2. with checkpoints taken (used checkpoint and restart solution provided in
OpenMPI implementation [139, 17]),
3. with migration (migration solution proposed in traditional HPC systems
[127]) and
4. with the FTDaemon (our proposed solution).
For the tests with checkpoints, the number of checkpoints used is shown in
Table 4.4, which also shows the number of live migrations associated with each
problem size as well as the minimum number of redundant hosts. We selected the
minimum number of redundant nodes based on [123, 121]. This helps to determine
the effect of checkpointing on computation-intensive applications running in a
cloud. Furthermore, the dollar cost implications of redundancy nodes proposed in
[14, 127] can be easily analysed with this setup.
Table 4.4: HPL with different problem sizes, host and compute nodes
PSIZE NH NRH NVMs NC NM
2000 2 0 2 2 2
4000 2 1 4 3 3
6000 4 1 8 4 4
8000 8 2 16 6 6
10000 16 3 32 7 7
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where:
• PSIZE = problem size
• NH = number of host/server
• NRH = number of redundant host/server
• NVMs = number of VMs in a cluster
• NC = number of checkpoints taken
• NM = number of live migrations
At the time of writing, the cost to lease each compute node with the above
configuration is $0.09 per hour while it costs $0.03 per hour to lease a 100GB
network drive. We use these figures to compare the cost of using checkpointing,
migration with provision of redundant hosts ahead of prediction of failure, and
our solution.
In the prototype implementation, we monitored the real-time CPU temperature,
CPU voltage, CPU fan speed, and CPU utilisation as a system reliability metric
with the FTDaemon running on each host. High temperature variations on the
nodes affect system reliability, degrade performance, and cause failure of CPUs
and circuits [126, 140]. We induced high temperatures on the CPU with the
running HPL. From our experiment conducted with different HPL problem sizes,
live migration of VM from one host/server to another host/server within the same
local area network (LAN) varies between 2 to 16 seconds (from start to finish). It
should also be noted that the live migration time and down time depend on the
configuration of the physical machine (host/server) and the configuration of the
virtual machine [46].
Although the service provider charged on a cost per hour basis, in our cost
analysis shown in Table 4.5, we assume cost per second. The cost per second is
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equivalent to computation-intensive applications that run for hours, weeks and
months. This enabled us to quantify the costs of checkpointing, providing a spare
node ahead of prediction failure of a compute node as proposed in [127], redundant
computing [14] and with our FT techniques.
Table 4.5: Cost analysis with different FT and nodes
Nn Ncr Psize $ch $r=1 $rn $FTDaemon
2 2 2000 97.81 74.14 81.14 81.14
2 3 4000 88.20 68.45 125.20 83.47
4 5 6000 268.28 214.86 321.07 256.85
8 10 8000 1266.14 879.58 1153.46 1025.29
16 18 10000 4102.82 2669.52 3857.88 3429.23
Nn = number of compute nodes
Ncr = number of compute and redundant nodes
Psize = problem size
$ch = dollar cost of running application with checkpointing (No redundant nodes)
$r=1 = dollar cost of running application (reliability = 1)
$rn = dollar cost of running application with redundant nodes provisoned
$FTDaemon = dolar cost of running with our approach (redundant nodes not
provisioned ahead of prediction)
The performance results of the three different fault tolerance cost models are
shown in Figure 4.5. As already stated above, we assume that all related factors
in equations (4.8) and (4.10) are the same. The result shows that the proposed
proactive fault tolerance approach to HPC in the cloud significantly reduces
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Figure 4.4: HPL with different problem sizes and nodes
the wall clock execution time and therefore the cost of computation-intensive
applications running in the cloud. We observed that our algorithm significantly
improved application resiliency at a reduced cost compared to more common
reactive approaches.
Periodic checkpointing can be used to provide FT for unpredictable failure.
However, the rate of checkpointing of computation-intensive application can be
reduced by as much as 50% to reduce the cost due to prediction.
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4.6 Related Work
Fault tolerance techniques for HPC applications with MPI can be classified into
two major groups:
1. Reactive fault tolerance techniques
2. Proactive fault tolerance techniques.
A reactive fault tolerance technique tends to minimise the impact of failure on
the computation-intensive applications in the presence of failure of one or more
computational nodes. A good example of reactive fault tolerance is checkpoint and
restart. Checkpoint and restart allows computation-intensive problems that may
take a long time to execute in HPC systems to be restarted from the point of failure
in the event of errors or failures. Checkpoint and restart techniques have received
considerable attention in the past [16, 85, 11, 125, 77, 124]. One of the major
issues with checkpoint and restart techniques is the overhead involved in saving the
execution state (reducing this overhead will ensure that a computation-intensive
application does not spend most of its time doing checkpointing).
To reduce the time required for checkpointing, several checkpointing optimisation
techniques have been proposed [125, 77, 141, 141, 77, 84]. The overall aim is to
reduce the actual elapsed time for execution of applications in the presence of
spontaneous failures because computer resources and time are wasted when the
system is executing fault tolerance strategies such as checkpointing
These efforts to reduce the overhead caused by checkpoint and restart fault
tolerance techniques in computation-intensive applications have not been effective.
Recent publications [10, 23, 87 88] show that with steadily increasing numbers of
components in today’s HPC systems, applications running on HPC systems may
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not be able to achieve meaningful progress with the basic checkpoint and restart
approach.
Proactive fault tolerance mitigates the effect of failure during the lifetime of
a computation-intensive application by taking proactive measures using failure
prediction techniques. The commonly used failure prediction techniques include
analysis of the RAS log and monitoring hardware parameters such as processor
temperatures, fan speeds and voltages. In the pioneering work of Nagarajan, et
al. [127] on proactive fault tolerance for HPC with Xen virtualisation, processes
are migrated from unhealthy nodes to spare nodes. However, this requires spare
nodes to be always available. This technique may not be cost efficient in cloud
computing because the spare nodes will be billed, and the cost of running the
application in the cloud will be higher.
Redundant computing has recently been proposed [14] to reduce wall-clock
time of computation-intensive application running in HPC systems in the presence
of failure. In redundant computing, each process is replicated a defined number of
times to counter the effect of component or node failure. The replicated processes
run in parallel. The replicated processes keep running when the primary processes
fail. In redundant computing, compute nodes are also replicated. The replication
of the compute nodes increases the energy utilisation and dollar cost of running
computation-intensive applications in HPC systems in the cloud.
Our work differs from previous work in that our fault tolerance algorithm
provides fault tolerance to HPC in the cloud at the hardware level at reduced
cost, while running in user space (under user’s control). It does not rely on the
existence of pre-configured spare nodes. In addition, our solution does not also
rely on redundant computing techniques. The proposed solution is cost effective
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compared to both redundant computing and the approach in [127, 14]. We derived
the cost model for running computation-intensive application in HPC systems in
the cloud. With our cost model, users may be able to weigh the cost of different
fault tolerance techniques. Our fault tolerance solution is particularly suited to
users who lease HaaS.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented the design and implementation of a proactive
fault tolerance framework for High Performance Computing (HPC) in the Cloud.
We derived the cost model for running computation-intensive application in HPC
systems in the clouds. We analysed the dollar cost of providing spare nodes ahead
of prediction of failure. We showed that our solution does not rely on the provision
of spare nodes ahead of the prediction of failure. We presented experimental results
carried out on a real cloud environment. The experimental results clearly show
that the proposed proactive fault tolerance approach to HPC systems in the cloud
can significantly improve the execution time of computation-intensive applications
by upto 30% and thereby reduce the dollar cost for running them by as much
as 30%. The frequency of checkpointing of computation-intensive applications
can also be reduced by 50% with our FTDaemon. Our approach can help reduce
energy consumption by reducing the wall execution time of computation-intensive
HPC applications in the presence of failure of one or more computational nodes.
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Chapter 5
Cost-effective Cloud Services for
HPC in the Cloud: IaaS or
HaaS?
In this chapter, we address the research question posed in Section 3.5.2 (HPC
systems research communities are concerned about the cost and computational
performance of different cloud services). The content of this chapter, with minor
changes, is extracted from our previous work, which has been presented at the
2013 International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Processing Techniques
and Applications (PDPTA’13) [33].
5.1 Introduction
In the scientific research domain, traditional High Performance Computing (e.g.,
Blue Gene/L, clusters of computers) is used to solve computation-intensive and/or
data-intensive problems. Traditional HPC systems are expensive and sometimes
involve huge start-up investment, technical and administrative support, and
job queuing. With the benefit of cloud computing, cloud services, such as
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Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) and Hardware as a Service (HaaS), enable
scientists and researchers to run their HPC applications in the cloud without the
upfront investment associated with traditional HPC infrastructure.
However, the cost of running HPC applications on the cloud may be high if
the cloud services are not well understood and cost-effective cloud services are not
chosen. If the dollar cost of running HPC applications in the cloud is high compared
to traditional HPC systems, the benefits of running computation-intensive application
on the cloud may be negated. HPC research communities are concerned about
the cost and computational performance of different cloud services.
In this chapter we analyse the computational performance and dollar cost of
running computation-intensive applications in HPC systems in the cloud when
IaaS and HaaS are leased. We find that the cost of executing computation-intensive
application when HaaS is leased is significantly lower than that of the IaaS model.
We show that there is significant improvement in computational performance of
the application on HaaS if the computation-intensive application is not a network
intensive application. Our experimental setup uses the Message Passing Interface
(MPI) implementation [111]. We provide our test results, but do not reveal the
identity of the cloud providers in order to avoid any head-to-head comparisons.
However, we do include the relevant technical details of the cloud instances.
5.2 Experimental Setup
We setup experimental environments to evaluate the computational performance
and dollar cost of running computation-intensive application on IaaS and HaaS.
Our experimental setup includes two services we have leased from two cloud
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service providers, referred to here as Cloud-A and Cloud-B. Cloud-A offers IaaS
in different kinds of cluster instances for HPC applications (for example, cluster
compute instances). Cloud-B offers HaaS that can be configured to run HPC
applications.
5.2.1 Cluster Compute Instances from Cloud-A (IaaS)
Cloud-A is one of the major cloud service providers. They offer IaaS in different
instances for HPC applications. Table 5.1 shows a sample of cluster compute
instances with price details of on-demand instances from cloud providers. The
cluster compute instances are available with commonly used Operating Systems
(OS) (Windows and Linux) in 32-bit and 64-bit platforms. For our experiments,
we chose the Ref-C virtual instance in Table 5.1 because it is widely used for HPC
applications. The instances use Xen full virtualisation (see Section 3.4.5). The
I/O network communication between the cluster instance is 10 Gigabit Ethernet.
In order to compare the computational performance and dollar cost of running
HPC applications when IaaS and HaaS services are leased, we leased a cluster
compute instance with a total of 16 processors. Details of the leased cluster
compute instance are shown in Table 5.2. We installed OpenMPI 1.6 [111] on
the node/virtual machine. OpenMPI is an open source implementation of the
Message Passage Interface (MPI).
5.2.2 HPC System on HaaS in the Cloud
As explained in Section 4.2, HaaS allows users to have full control of the system
and control environment for measuring system performance and other experiments.
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This enables users to determine the number of VMs to be deployed for HPC
applications. We leased a HaaS instance (Ref-G) with 64GB RAM from Cloud-B.
Table 5.1 shows some of the cloud services offered by the HaaS providers that are
similar to cluster compute instances offered by Cloud-A. The table also gives a
summary of HaaS and the price of the leased service. The communication network
between each HaaS is a 1 Gigabit Ethernet.
A summary of the virtual machines we provisioned on the HaaS is shown
in Table 5.2. We installed Xen hypervisor [112] on the host. Xen hypervisor is
an open source, industry standard virtualisation technology. Linux Operating
System (Ubuntu 12.4 64-bit) runs on top of the Xen hypervisor. We imported
our pre-configured para-virtualised guest operating system (Ubuntu 12.4 64-bit)
on the HaaS instance. The pre-configured para-virtualised guest reduces the time
needed to setup the HPC system on the HaaS instance. A para-virtualised OS
uses a modified kernel, reduces the size of the image and improves performance
[136, 114]. The virtual machine is configured to have 16 processors with 60GB
memory and 200GB hard drive. We installed OpenMPI on the node. This setup
is almost equivalent to the cluster compute instances we leased from Cloud-A.
The setup also provides a good comparison environment for IaaS and HaaS in
terms of computational performance and dollar cost. Table 5.2 shows both the
IaaS and HaaS environments we used.
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Table 5.2: The cost analysis virtual machine of IaaS and virtual machine of HaaS
Cloud-A, VM of IaaS Cloud-B, VM of HaaS
Architecture: x86-64 Architecture: x86-64
RAM: 22GB RAM: 60 GB
CPU op-mode(s): 32-bit, 64-bit CPU op-mode(s): 64-bit
CPU(s): 16 CPU(s): 16
NUMA node(s): 1 NUMA node(s): 1
Vendor ID: GenuineIntel Vendor ID: GenuineIntel
CPU family: 6 CPU family: 6
Model: 26 Model: 26
Stepping: 5 Stepping: 5
CPU MHz: 2933.440 CPU MHz: 2933.468
Hypervisor vendor: Xen Hypervisor vendor: Xen
Virtualisation type: full Virtualisation type: para
L1d cache: 32K L1d cache: 32K
L1i cache: 32K L1i cache: 32K
L2 cache: 256K L2 cache: 256K
L3 cache: 8192K L3 cache: 8192K
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5.3 MPI Applications and Benchmark
We used a commonly used HPC benchmark and real HPC application to analyse
and evaluate the MPI applications running on IaaS and HaaS services. The
benchmark was the High Performance Linpack (HPL) benchmark [138] and the
application was ClustalW-MPI [117]. We describe these below.
HPL [138] is a benchmark that is commonly used to evaluate the compuc1tationalc1 -
performance of HPC systems such as top500 [2]. It measures the floating execution
rate of linear equations based on the problem size. We executed the HPL
benchmark with five different problem sizes of 2,000, 4,000, 6,000, 8,000 and
10,000 on both cloud services on virtual machines from IaaS and on HaaS. The
execution of each problem size was carried out twice and the average execution
time was calculated. The five different problem sizes enable us to obtain different
wall clock execution times of HPL. We recorded the wall clock execution time for
each problem size. We used the wall clock execution time to analyse the dollar
cost and computational performance of both platforms. Figure 5.1 shows the
results obtained on computational-performance.
ClustalW-MPI [117] is a parallel implementation of ClustalW [142] which is
based on MPI. ClustalW is a tool that is widely used in bioinformatics for multiple
alignments of nucleic acid and protein sequences. It uses three alignment steps:
pairwise alignment, guide-tree generation and progressive alignment. We ran
a sample of ‘A full multiple sequence alignment’, ‘A guide tree only sequence
alignment’, and ‘A multiple sequence alignment out of an existing’ on nodes from
IaaS and from HaaS. We recorded the execution time of the three alignment steps
to compare time to finish executions with both IaaS and HaaS. The results are
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shown in figure 5.2.
5.4 Results and Discussion
One of the major attractions of the Cloud-A cluster compute instance is that
it is relatively easy to setup the clusters compared to setting up a cluster in
HaaS. However, some level of technical knowledge is required to setup clusters
on Cloud-A that will run HPC applications, due to the varying needs of HPC
applications. In order to reduce the time to setup an HPC system on HaaS
instances in the cloud, we uploaded our pre-configured para-virtualised image
to the cloud. Similar VM images can be downloaded from different sites. We
estimated that this technique reduces the setup time by up to 80%. We did not
compare the setup time for the HPC system between Cloud-A (IaaS) and Cloud-B
(HaaS) because setup time varies with the individual user’s technical experience.
From the computational performance result of the HPL benchmark shown in
Figure 5.3, we can see that the wall clock execution time of the HPL benchmark on
a provisioned instance on HaaS is shorter than that of IaaS provided by Cloud-A.
We achieved this because the memory of the virtual instances deployed on HaaS
is 60GB. We chose to allocate this amount of memory to our virtual instance
because we can predict the memory needed. This option is not available for the
IaaS instance (users cannot change the memory of the virtual instance chosen).
We also had full control of the hardware instance and virtual instances.
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Figure 5.1: Computational performance of High Performance Linpack on 1 node
with 16 processors
As shown in Figure 5.3, executing the HPL on 1 node with 16 processors
eliminates the bandwidth inequality on both providers. The virtual instance on
HaaS outperforms IaaS. This is because we had full control of the applications
running on our HaaS instance and we allocated higher memory to the virtual
machine on HaaS. On IaaS, other virtual instances may have been hosted on the
hardware, which may have affected the performance of the application running
on our leased IaaS instance. As shown in [135], high resource allocations on
infrastructure affect applications running on virtual machines.
The ClustalW-MPI results are shown in Figure 5.2. Cloud-A IaaS uses a 10
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Gigabit Ethernet network, whereas the HaaS we leased uses a 1 gigabit Ethernet
network. We could have used benchmarks with the same bandwidths, however
the two major providers of HaaS do not have a 10 gigabit Ethernet network.
The results in Figure 5.2 show that there is no significant impact on application
running on IaaS and on virtual instances on HaaS.
0	  
5	  
10	  
15	  
20	  
25	  
A	  full	  mul+ple	  
sequence	  alignment	  
A	  guide	  tree	  only	  	  
sequence	  alignment	  
A	  mul+ple	  sequence	  
alignment	  out	  of	  an	  
exis+ng	  tree	  
W
al
l	  c
lo
ck
	  e
xe
cu
+
on
	  +
m
e	  
in
	  s
ec
on
ds
	  
Cloud-­‐A	  (VM	  of	  IaaS)	  
Cloud-­‐B	  (VM	  of	  HaaS)	  
Figure 5.2: Performance of ClustalW-MPI application on 16 processors
5.5 Cost Analysis
At the time of writing, Cloud-A offers different price models to their cluster
compute instance customers. The most widely used price model is called ’on-demand
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instances’. The on-demand instances price model allows users to pay hourly without
a contract, whereas other price models may require up-front payments and/or
contracts.
Cloud-B offers their customers a pay-as-you-go price model, which is similar
to on-demand instance prices offered by Cloud-A. Therefore we use on-demand
price instance to compare the cost of running computation-intensive applications
on both cloud services. There are additional charges for some cloud services,
such as network bandwidth and IP addresses, but we do not consider these to
avoid complexity. Both cloud providers, however, charge a similar rate for such
services. We used the results obtained from HPL benchmarking to analyse the
cost. Previous similar cost analyses [143, 22], assumed that 1 second is equal
to the hourly rate, and we use the same assumption here (although both cloud
providers offer an hourly rate). This also allows us to do the analysis without
paying for the hours the experiment would have cost. We used the prices of the
leased services as shown in Table 5.1. The cost analysis computation of IaaS and
HaaS is shown in Figure 5.3.
Based on the computational performance and cost analysis, it appears that it
is more cost effective to lease HaaS and configure the HPC systems. Cloud service
users of HaaS have full control of the hardware as well as the virtual machines they
provisioned. Application performance and other metrics can be easily measured.
From the result, the cost of running HPC applications can be reduced by as much
as 20% when HaaS is leased.
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Figure 5.3: The cost analysis; virtual machine of IaaS and virtual machine of
HaaS
5.6 Related Work
Cloud computing promises numerous benefits, which includes no up front investments
for HPC applications, which is attractive, compared to traditional HPC systems.
Many studies have evaluated the suitability of HPC systems in the cloud and
showed that it is expected that more computation-intensive HPC applications
will be run in the cloud HPC than traditional HPC systems [19, 22, 144, 145].
Furthermore, the Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) cluster recently
appeared in Top500 list [2] in year 2010, which shows that there is a viable future
for HPC systems in the cloud.
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Many past researches evaluating of HPC applications on HPC systems in the
Cloud with emphasis on Amazon EC2 have been carried out. These investigations
focus on the performance of Amazon EC2 and Traditional HPC systems [143, 22,
144, 19].
Carlyle et al. [143] studied the cost effective HPC System. They show that
it is more cost effective for institutions like Purdue University to operate a
community/traditional cluster than to lease HPC resources from Amazon EC2.
This study clearly shows that Amazon on-demand cluster compute instances prices
are not cost effective for HPC applications for some institutions. Their work
focuses on Amazon EC2 service IaaS and traditional HPC systems.
Deelman et al. [22] in their work on ’The Cost of Doing Science on the Cloud:
The Montage examples’; show that the cost of cloud services could be significantly
reduced without significant impact on application performance, if the right storage
and compute resources are provisioned. However, they did not consider different
platforms like HaaS. We extended their work, demonstrating that HaaS can
significantly reduce the cost of running computation-intensive application on HPC
in the cloud.
Ekanayake and Fox [144] compare HPC applications with different needs and
showed the performance of applications with latency. However, they did not
compare the cost of executing computation-intensive application on different
services such as IaaS and HaaS.
Yao et al. [146] showed that optimal cost-performance ratio can be achieved
with the appropriate cloud instance. However, they did not consider cost and
computational performance when IaaS and HaaS are leased.
Although others [143, 147, 144, 19, 148] have compared the computational
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performance and dollar cost of using different cloud service such PaaS, IaaS and
traditional HPC systems. However, our work is different from other work in
that we study and compare the computational performance and dollar cost of
running computation-intensive application in HPC in the cloud when IaaS and
HaaS are leased. We experimentally demonstrated that the dollar cost of running
computation-intensive application can be reduced as much as 20% with HaaS
without significant impact to performance. With this experimental results, HPC
system communities are equipped with cost analysis that would help them to
select cost effective cloud service for HPC systems in the cloud.
5.7 Summary
Due to the huge capital investment required to own a traditional HPC systems
which typically involves job queuing, using an HPC system in the cloud is a good
alternative. Cloud computing offers IaaS and HaaS for deployment of cluster
instances, which can be used to run computation-intensive applications. IaaS
provides almost ready to use clusters with minimal deployment installation tasks.
With HaaS, virtual machines can be provisioned to run computation-intensive
application. We have conducted experimental analysis to determine the performance
and cost when cloud services IaaS and HaaS are leased to run computation-intensive
application. We showed that the dollar cost of running computation-intensive
application in the cloud can be reduced by as much as 20% when HaaS is leased.
We showed that there is no significant impact in performance of the applications
when executed on the leased HaaS.
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Chapter 6
Summary, Conclusions and
Future work
This chapter summarises the thesis, presents our conclusions and makes recommendations
for future work.
6.1 Summary
Key points from each chapter are summarised below.
In Chapter 1, we presented an overview of the research background and
motivation, and identified key research problems and contributions. The role
of HPC systems in today’s society, for instance in weather forecasting, were
discussed. We showed that the number of processors and nodes in HPC systems
has increased over time in a quest to achieve greater performance levels and that,
with this increase, the overall system MTBF has been reduced to just a few
hours. Traditional HPC systems require huge capital investment, and we argued
that HPC systems in the cloud offer a good alternative. We identified the key
research problems and stated our motivation to provide a proactive fault tolerance
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framework for HPC systems in the cloud. The major contributions of this thesis
were identified.
In Chapter 2, we reviewed related work on fault tolerance and analysed
failure rates in HPC systems. Although it is difficult to determine the single most
common root cause of failure, we showed that computation-intensive applications
are most frequently interrupted by hardware failures, software failures, or human
error. We proposed that a good fault tolerance mechanism should be able to
mitigate or, in some cases, even eliminate the consequences of failure. We surveyed
fault tolerance mechanisms (redundancy, migration, failure making and recovery)
for HPC and identified the pros and cons of each technique. Research efforts
directed at reducing the time required for saving the checkpoint in persistent
storage were described.
Recovery techniques, which are commonly used in HPC systems, were discussed
in detail and over 20 checkpoint/restart facilities were surveyed. The rollback
feature requirements identified were used to evaluate them and the results were
provided in tabular format as an aid for research in this area. The web site of each
surveyed checkpoint/restart facility was provided to facilitate further investigation.
Chapter 3 presented the conceptual background of HPC systems in the cloud
that are the subject of this thesis. We explained cloud computing architectures
and their benefits and identified the two main categories of cloud players (cloud
provides and cloud users). The different cloud service models, SaaS, PaaS, IaaS
and HaaS, were explained and their challenges with respect to HPC systems in
the cloud were presented. The four types of cloud computing available for HPC
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systems were discussed.
HPC systems in the cloud usually consist of a head node and compute nodes.
The head node and compute nodes are virtual machines configured to fit their
roles. The head node usually handles the user login, resource management, jobs
assignment and network file system. Compute nodes are normally accessed through
the head node. Compute nodes perform the computation-intensive job assigned
by the head and produce results. The head node and compute nodes communicate
through the Message Passing Interface. Failure of a head node and/or compute
node(s) commonly leads to failure of the HPC system.
We identified two additional challenges: system reliability (hardware failures,
software failures and virtual machine failures) and cost (which cloud service is
cost effective for HPC systems?). This thesis addresses these challenges.
Chapter 4 we described the design and implementation of a proactive fault
tolerance framework for High Performance Computing (HPC) systems in the
cloud. We derived the cost model for running computation-intensive applications
in HPC systems in the cloud. We analysed the dollar cost of providing spare
nodes ahead of prediction of failure. We showed that our solution does not rely
on the provision of spare nodes ahead of the prediction of failure. We presented
experimental results carried out in a real cloud environment.
The experimental results clearly show that the proposed proactive fault
tol-erance approach to HPC systems in the cloud can significantly improve the
execution time of computation-intensive applications and thereby reduce the
dollar cost of running them by as much as 30%. The frequency of checkpointing
of computation-intensive applications can also be reduced by 50% with our
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FT-Daemon. Our approach can help reduce energy consumption by reducing the
wall execution time of computation-intensive HPC applications in the presence of
failure of one or more computational nodes.
In Chapter 5, we addressed the research question posed in Chapter 3 (the
cost and computational performance of different cloud services). Due to the huge
capital investment required to own a traditional HPC system, which typically
involves job queuing, using an HPC system in the cloud is a good alternative.
Cloud computing offers IaaS and HaaS for deployment of cluster instances, which
can be used to run computation-intensive applications. IaaS provides almost
ready-to-use clusters with minimal deployment installation tasks. With HaaS,
virtual machines can be provisioned to run computation-intensive applications.
We have conducted experimental analysis to determine the performance and
cost when cloud services IaaS and HaaS are leased to run computation-intensive
applications. We showed that the dollar cost of running computation-intensive
applications in the cloud can be reduced by as much as 20% when HaaS is leased.
We showed that there is no significant impact in performance of the applications
when executed on the leased HaaS.
6.2 Conclusions
The theoretical concepts behind the architecture of HPC systems in the cloud
that are discussed in this thesis provide a significant resource for researchers
investigating the relatively new field of HPC systems in the cloud.
The analysis of failure rates of HPC systems presented in this work shows that
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failure is one of the major concerns of the HPC systems community, particularly
when the number of processors increases to thousands. The analysis provides
results that can be used for further investigation.
The experimental results from the comparison of existing fault tolerance
solutions and the proposed proactive fault tolerance approach to HPC systems in
the cloud show that the proposed solution can significantly improve the execution
time of computation-intensive applications and thereby reduce the dollar cost for
running them by as much as 30%. In this proposed solution, the frequency of
checkpointing of computation-intensive applications can also be reduced by 50%
with our FTDaemon. Based on the experimental results, the proposed approach
can help reduce energy consumption by decreasing the wall execution time of
computation-intensive HPC applications in the presence of failure of one or more
computational nodes.
The experimental analysis to determine the performance and cost when cloud
services IaaS and HaaS are leased to run computation-intensive application shows
that HaaS is more cost effective for HPC applications. These results indicate to
the HPC community that the cost of running HPC applications can be reduced
with HaaS without significant computational performance issues.
The solution proposed in this thesis cannot predict failures that occur without
prior warning window. For example, sudden power failure and operator’s error.
Consequently, reactive fault tolerance may be used to recover from the hardware
failure.
In summary, we have provided an analysis of the failure rate of HPC systems,
an evaluation of checkpoint/restart facilities, and an overview of HPC systems
in the cloud (theoretical concepts and architecture). We proposed a proactive
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fault tolerance solution for HPC systems in the cloud and identified the most cost
effective cloud service for HPC systems in the cloud. In doing so, we have made
a significant contribution to the community of HPC systems users through the
provision of tools that provide solutions to current problems and useful insights to
facilitate further investigation on fault tolerance and other potential applications.
6.3 Future Work
A guide for future research has been provided in each chapter. This section
summarises these recommendations and adds some new suggestions.
One area of future work is to use the rollback feature requirements identified
in subsection 2.2.6 and the results of the evaluation of checkpoint/restart provided
in section 2.6 to investigate how rollback would be applied in HPC systems in
the cloud with reduced overheads. At present, the overheads associated with
checkpoint/restart activities somewhat limit its usability in HPC systems in the
cloud.
Another area that we would suggest for future research involves the creation of
efficient tools to reduce the setup time for HPC systems in the cloud, particularly
when HaaS is leased. This would reduce the challenges faced by users of HPC
systems in the cloud, particularly when they lease HaaS.
We recommend further investigation and experiments to determine the time
window between prediction of failure and the time the predicted failure occurs.
Such research may help to identify the optimal time window for accessing the risk
of failure. A time window is useful for determining if a deferred action policy might
be a desirable option. For example, if an HPC system in the cloud is running a
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computation-intensive application and the application is likely to finish before
the predicted failure occurs, there is no point taking proactive action because
the application would have finished execution and the lease would have been
relinquished before the failure occurs.
HPC systems in the cloud are relatively a new field. We would recommend
that a decade worth of field failure data from HPC systems in the cloud should
be collated and analysed. Currently, such field failure data is not available. HPC
systems in the cloud field failure data analysis would provide comprehensive
insights on the reliability of HPC systems in the cloud. It would also provide
detailed information on the factors that causes HPC systems in the cloud failures
and how to mitigate unavoidable failures.
The behaviour of VMs, when used in large-scale such as HPC systems in the
cloud may be unpredictable. This is particularly notable when IaaS is leased
because the VMs running HPC applications may be sharing computer resources
with other VMs leased by other cloud users. This can significantly have impact on
performance of computation-intensive application running on HPC systems in the
cloud. We recommend that mathematical performance model that would focus
on predicting and comparing computation-intensive application’s performance on
HPC systems in the cloud based on HaaS and IaaS infrastructure is investigated.
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Table A.1: Future failure prediction and warning state table
Ti Fi Vi Ci State
0 0 1 1 warning
0 1 0 1 warning
0 1 1 0 warning
0 1 1 1 future failure predicted
1 0 0 1 warning
1 0 1 0 warning
1 0 1 1 future failure predicted
1 1 0 0 warning
1 1 0 1 future failure predicted
1 1 1 0 future failure predicted
1 1 1 1 future failure predicted
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Table A.2: Checkpoint/restart facilities
Author Checkpoint name
and link
Brief description of
the checkpoint
Transparent OS/Application
coverage
Automatic Sockets
(Zhong
and Niel,
2001)[78]
CRAK
http://systems.
cs.columbia.edu/
archive/pub/2001/
11/
It requires no
modification of OS
or application code.
Target’s processes are
stopped before they
are checkpointed.
Transparent
Kernel
module
utilities
Supports migration of
networked processes,
however; it does not
support virtualization
and multi-threaded
process. It works on
Linux 2.2 and 2.4
kernel platform
User
initiated
It supports
TCP/UDP
sockets
Continued on next page
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Continued on next page
Author Checkpoint name
and link
Brief description of
the checkpoint
Transparent OS/Application
coverage
Automatic Sockets
(Pinheiro,
2001)
[149]
Epckpt
http://www.
research.rutgers.
edu~edpin/epckpt/
Supports symmetric
multiprocessors and
does not require
modification of OS
or application code
in other to use the
facility.
Transparent,
Kernel level
implementation
Supports system V
IPC (Semaphores and
Shared Memory), fork
parallel applications,
dynamic load libraries.
Linux 2.0, 2.2 and 2.4
kernels.
User
initiated and
non-periodic.
Cannot
checkpoint
sockets, timers
(sleeping
processes will
be awakened)
and System V
IPC Messages
Queues
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Author Checkpoint name
and link
Brief description of
the checkpoint
Transparent OS/Application
coverage
Automatic Sockets
(Condor
Team,
2010) [76]
Condor
http://www.cs.
wisc.edu/condor/
Enabled by the user
through linking the
program source code
with the condor system
call library.
Not
transparent,
library
implementation
Supports single
processes but
multi-process jobs
and system calls
are not supported.
Multiple kernel-level
threads and memory
mapped programs are
not allowed. Works on
kernel 2.4 and later
Periodic and
user initiated
Interprocess
communication
is not allowed
(e.g., pipes,
semaphores, and
shared memory)
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Continued on next page
Author Checkpoint name
and link
Brief description of
the checkpoint
Transparent OS/Application
coverage
Automatic Sockets
(Plank et
al, 1995)
[77]
Libckpt
http://web.eecs.
utk.edu/~plank/
plank/www/libckpt.
html
It is implemented
in user space. It
uses copy-on-write
and incremental
checkpointing
mechanism but
requires recompiling of
the source code.
Not
completely
transparent.
Library
implementation
It support files and
multiprocessor. It does
not provide support for
multithread, pipes, Sys
V IPC or distributed
application
Periodic Does not
support sockets
Continued on next page
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Author Checkpoint name
and link
Brief description of
the checkpoint
Transparent OS/Application
coverage
Automatic Sockets
(Stellner,
1996)
[150]
CoCheck
http://www.lrr.
in.tum.de/Par/
tools/Projects.
Old/CoCheck.html
User level MPI
implementation.
CoCheck uses a special
process to coordinate
checkpoints.
Transparent,
library
implementation
Supports parallel
processes running
on multicomputer;
CoCheck can be ported
to different machine
platforms. CoCheck
cannot process a
checkpoint request
when a send operation
is in progress [70]
Periodic Supports TCP
sockets
Continued on next page
121
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Author Checkpoint name
and link
Brief description of
the checkpoint
Transparent OS/Application
coverage
Automatic Sockets
(Ansel et
al, 2009)
[65]
DMTCP
http://dmtcp.
sourceforge.net/
Coordinated
transparent user
level checkpointing
for distributed
applications.
Transparent,
Library
implementation.
Supports distributed
and multithreaded
applications. It
support Linux 2.4.x
and later
Periodic and
manually
initiated
Provides
supports for
sockets but does
not support
multicast and
RDMA (remote
direct memory
access).
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Author Checkpoint name
and link
Brief description of
the checkpoint
Transparent OS/Application
coverage
Automatic Sockets
(Duell et
al, 2002)
[63]
BLCR
https://ftg.lbl.
gov/projects/
CheckpointRestart/
CheckpointDownloads
System-level and MPI
implementation for
clusters
Transparent Supports serial and
parallel job. It also
support single machine
or parallel jobs that
run across multiple
machines on cluster
node. It partially
supports multithread
applications. Its kernel
modules are portable
across difference CPU
architectures. BLCR
works on kernel 2.4.x
and later.
User
initiated
Does not
checkpoint or
restore open
sockets or files
like TCP/UDP
Continued on next page
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Author Checkpoint name
and link
Brief description of
the checkpoint
Transparent OS/Application
coverage
Automatic Sockets
(Zandy,
2002)
[151]
Ckpt
http://pages.cs.
wisc.edu/~zandy/
ckpt/
Implemented at
user-level. Supports
asynchronous
checkpoints and
does not require re-link
to programs
Transparent,
library
implementation
Provides checkpointing
functionality to an
ordinary program.
Linux 2.4 and later
Periodic
checkpoint
or manual
initiation
Does not
support
TCP/UDP
sockets
(Overeinder
et al,
1996)
[152]
Dynamite
http://www.
science.uva.nl/
research/scs/
Software/ckpt/
#references
User level
implementation
Not
transparent
â€“ requires
re-linking of
libraries
Supports open files,
dynamically loaded
libraries and parallel
processes (PVM/MPI)
but does not
support multithread
applications. Linux
2.0, 2.2 and later
Periodic Supports
TCP/UDP
sockets
Continued on next page
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Author Checkpoint name
and link
Brief description of
the checkpoint
Transparent OS/Application
coverage
Automatic Sockets
(Osman,
2002) [79]
Zap
http://www.ncl.
cs.columbia.edu/
research/migrate/
Uses partial OS
virtualization
to allow the
migration of process
domains. It uses
Checkpoint-restart
mechanism of CRAK
using a modified Linux
kernel.
Transparent,
Kernel
module,
library.
Supports single-thread
and multithread
process. It also
supports SYS V IPC.
Linux 2.4 and later
User
initiated
Supports
TCP/UDP
sockets, devices
files.
(Sudakov
et al,
2007)
[153]
CHPOX
http://freshmeat.
net/projects/
chpox/
Systems-level
implementation and
does not require
modification of OS or
user programs
Transparent
and uses
kernel
module
Supports files and pipes
however multithreaded
programs are not
supported. Linux2.4
and later
User
initiated
Network
sockets are
not supported
Continued on next page
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Author Checkpoint name
and link
Brief description of
the checkpoint
Transparent OS/Application
coverage
Automatic Sockets
(Ramkumar
and
Strumpen,
1997)
[154]
Porch
http://supertech.
csail.mit.edu/
porch/
Implemented at user
level space.
Uses source
to source
compilation
to provide
checkpointing
solution in
heterogeneous
environment
Not transparent,
recompiling
Multithread
and distributed
applications are not
supported.
Periodic
checkpoint
File I/O and
socket I/O are
not supported.
(Gibson)
[75]
Esky
http://esky.
sourceforge.net/
User-level
checkpointing and use
job freezing techniques
(checkpoint/resume)
for Unix processes.
Transparent
library
implementation
Has limited application
coverage. Esky can
cope with programs
that open or mmap()
files. Linux 2.2 and
later; and Solaris 2.6.
User
initiated
Currently works
on a limited
opening shared
libraries with
dlopen().
Continued on next page
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Author Checkpoint name
and link
Brief description of
the checkpoint
Transparent OS/Application
coverage
Automatic Sockets
(Sankaran
et al,
2004) [70]
OpenMPI
(LAM/MPI LA-MPI)
http://www.
lam-mpi.org/
A user-level facility
that uses coordinated
protocol and BLCR
library to checkpoint
MPI applications
Not
transparent
Uses BLCR facility
to checkpoint parallel
MPI applications. It
works on recent kernels
Periodic Supports
Ethernet,
InfiniBand,
Myrinet
(Blackham,
2005)
[155]
CryoPID
http://cryopid.
berlios.de/
Uses freeze techniques
in checkpointing. It
copy the state of a
running process and
writes it into a file.
Transparent,
utilizes
dynamically
linked library
Supports single thread
process. However,
it does not support
multithread processes.
Linux 2.4 and later.
User
initiated
Partial
support to
file descriptors,
sockets and X
applications
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Continued on next page
Author Checkpoint name
and link
Brief description of
the checkpoint
Transparent OS/Application
coverage
Automatic Sockets
(William
and
James,
2001)
[156]
Libtckpt
http://mtckpt.
sourceforge.net/
Implemented at
user-level and requires
recompiling
Not
transparent,
Library
Supports
multithreaded
applications and
Linux and Solaris
Periodic UDP sockets not
supported
(Takahashi
et al,
2000)
[157]
Score No modifications to the
application source is
required
Transparent,
library
Supports parallel
applications
Periodic Supports for
Myrinet and
Ethernet.
Continued on next page
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Author Checkpoint name
and link
Brief description of
the checkpoint
Transparent OS/Application
coverage
Automatic Sockets
(Fagg and
Dongarra,
2000)
[158]
FT-MPI
http://icl.cs.utk.
edu/ftmpi/index.
html
Coordinated
checkpointing
facility and uses
messages logging
protocol to checkpoint
applications.
Not
transparent
Supports parallel
applications
Semi-automatic Ethernet,
Infiniband,
Myrinet
Continued on next page
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Author Checkpoint name
and link
Brief description of
the checkpoint
Transparent OS/Application
coverage
Automatic Sockets
(Ruscio et
al, 2007)
[159]
DejaVu Coordinated
checkpointing facility
and implemented in
user space. Virtualizes
at the OS interface.
Transparent
and library
implementation
DejaVu supports
parallel and distributed
applications. Supports
forked processes.
Permits completely
asynchronous
checkpoints, it
also support
anonymous mmap()
and incremented
checkpointing
Periodic Supports
communication
sockets. It
supports
Infiniband
through custom
MVAPICH.
Continued on next page
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Continued on next page
Author Checkpoint name
and link
Brief description of
the checkpoint
Transparent OS/Application
coverage
Automatic Sockets
(Schulz et
al, 2004)
[74]
C3 (Cornell
Check-point(pre)
Compiler)
http://www.psc.
edu/science/2005/
pingali/
Application-level
checkpointing and
does require program
modification
Not
transparent
Supports single-thread
and distributed
application. C3 system
is easily ported among
different architectures
and operating systems.
Program
initiated
Does not
support
infiniband
and Myrinet
Continued on next page
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Author Checkpoint name
and link
Brief description of
the checkpoint
Transparent OS/Application
coverage
Automatic Sockets
(Bosilca
et al,
2002)
[160]
MPICH-V
http://mpich-v.
lri.fr/
Its implementation
is based on
uncoordinated and
distributed message
logging techniques.
MPICH-V relies on the
Channel Memory(CM)
techniques
Partial
Transparent
Supports parallel
applications. It uses
Checkpoint server
scheduler which is
not synchronized with
checkpoint server.
Works in all Unix
flavor. It also works in
Windows x86 and x64
Automatic Supports
Ethernet and
Myrinet
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